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
# ***JPRS Report***

## ***Supplement***

# **East Europe**

***Hungary: MDF Vice President Csurka's  
Political Treatise, Related Articles***

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# East Europe

## Hungary: MDF Vice President Csurka's Political Treatise, Related Articles

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17 September 1992

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## MDF Vice President Csurka's Political Treatise

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in Hungarian 20 Aug 92 pp 9-16

[Article by Istvan Csurka, parliamentary representative and vice president of the Hungarian Democratic Forum: "A Few Thoughts in Conjunction With the Two Years Since the System Change and With the New MDF Program"]

[Text] In September 1987, when the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] adopted the Lakitelek Statement and embarked on its path, no one envisioned—because no sober mind could envision at the time—a complete system change materializing within a short period of time. The Soviet global system was still a coherent whole. Although festering wounds covered the body of history's monster and the sweat of death appeared on its forehead, no one in that tent [at Lakitelek] or elsewhere could tell how long the agony would last. It was particularly unclear whether the West, and its leading power the United States, would hasten the collapse, or, alarmed by nuclear and political risks caused by a foundering Soviet control deck, would decide to salvage the system. The latter appeared as more likely in light of support given to the system's "reform forces," to Gorbachev and his circle.

Unquestionably, from the standpoint of the United States, the bipolar world did not, by far, translate solely into confrontation; it also enabled that country to check the often troublesome economic strength of allied competitors.

In 1987, and even thereafter, practical politics and a chance to live amounted to taking advantage of a Gorbachev supported by the West, and containing arch-bolshevik forces that rose against him even in Hungary. In the final analysis, however, this, also meant that one could not transgress the given "framework."

At Lakitelek the MDF added the task entrusted to it by its spiritual forebears: ensuring that reforms focus on resolving the

### vital issues of the Hungarian people.

This involved a contradiction, of course. Without saying so, everyone knew that the vital issues of the Hungarian people could be resolved, or, if they could not be resolved, at least a full solution could be achieved only outside the established framework, and only under a different system, including liberation from Soviet rule and the full liquidation of the party state system. It thus followed that the Lakitelek gathering chose not the best solution, but *the best possible solution*, convinced that doing so would be of greatest service to Hungarian society.

But the processes of disintegration in the Soviet Union proved to be irreversible. And while the West pondered whether to provide tangible evidence of its political support in the form of checks to reform communists organizing the change, and if so, what the amounts of

those checks should be, the Soviet Empire collapsed with a crash that was relatively small compared to its size. Accordingly, history, and not those who direct global politics at the highest level, made the decision. Therefore, while recognizing that the MDF was unprepared for the crash, we must also ask this objective question: Was anyone else prepared for it?

What does one do when an unexpected historical opportunity presents itself? One obviously improvises. Before severely condemning the MDF and the present Hungarian government for a series of improvisations, however, let us raise this question: What global political factor does not act the same way today, creating not at all amusing programs out of improvisations described as major decisions?

Perhaps only China and Japan manifest some plan and consistency, and Israeli policies, too, show a certain one-directional approach of their own. China is sure of itself, and rightfully so, because of its impenetrable masses, its millennia of being a closed society, and its simple form of life. China exists, its existence must be recognized just as one recognizes the existence of the Earth or the waves in the sea. Aside from similar characteristics, Japan is also made strong and autonomous by the extraordinary manner in which its people relate to work and duty, and by the resultant, extremely high accumulation of capital in the form of labor. And Israel is bound together by a constant sense of endangerment; prevention is a constant part of its policies and national consciousness.

In contrast, Europe has wrecks of empires. Both the winners and the losers finished World War II with heavy losses of prestige. All powers in Europe, even the economically strongest Germany, have their steps counter-signed in Washington, and try to make happy faces when they receive support and are checked in the framework of a system of alliances.

Multinational large corporations exercise an immeasurably large amount of power. Individual freedom, prosperity and consumer consciousness promise to produce forms of existence that can be maintained in the long term only under conditions of global peace; this peace, however, is threatened by a world divided along the conflict line of misery and prosperity, by billions of people who starve and therefore could be "recruited to fight," and could be mobilized. Great tension exists between the North and the South; uncertainty characterizes the condition of the world.

All this serves only to augment the insignificance, the "misery of small European states." To let some European state meddle with their affairs would not pay, but they are not much better off even the way things stand today, when entry to the European sphere of interest requires permission from overseas and they increasingly fall behind amid much indecision.

In today's Central Europe a kind of adaptability—heretofore unknown in history and in other parts of the world—is needed not only in politics, but also in everyday life. This adaptation must be quick and immediate, in other words: *Here improvisation is a way of life.*

The failure rate is high, of course.

Perhaps the biggest mistake made in the history of the MDF and the government was the failure to reveal this factual circumstance, this condition of loneliness, defenselessness and need for self-reliance. The MDF and the government failed to make apparent that a joint effort was needed to climb out of the putrid gulch of gulyas-communism and to reach the peak of a new, free and independent life.

But there is an excuse for this, too: Is it reasonable nowadays to expect a European nation to make an effort? And if not, is it permissible to request that an effort be made?

Comfort is in greatest demand by today's consumer and TV-watching people. As Konrad Lorenz wrote back in 1972: "The lowest household servant would protest in outrage, if offered a room with heating, lighting, resting, and bathroom facilities that were perfectly acceptable to Goethe, the secret counsellor to the Court, or even to the Weimar Grand Duchess Anna Amalia."

Today's people are no longer capable of struggling for some goal if that deprives them of certain things or requires hard work, because they are no longer familiar with the form of satisfaction that follows the achievement of a goal. Instead of struggling, the purchase of small doses of instant gratification became the practice, and this attitude has also been stimulated by advertisements. Accordingly, proposing that there was a need for such collective effort would be risky. And this is particularly true insofar as Hungarian society is concerned.

This situation exists in Hungary because the Kadar era meant decades of infinite self-exploitation. People belonging to a very broad range of social groups flung themselves wholeheartedly into overtime work, home construction projects and the establishment of life conditions similar to those in the West, and very many people managed to accumulate an assortment of luxuries. All this resulted in fatigue; increasingly thinner strata of society are willing to make this kind of effort by now.

Reduced real income, a declining standard of living and the loss of opportunities to live on credit—all of which resulted from the system change and from the necessary transformation of the economic structure—only added to this fatigue. Many, many families were forced to learn that things they had acquired as a result of a decade of hard work—cleverness often turns into hard work in retrospect—was now lost or at least threatened, instead of becoming sources of joy in the greater freedom produced by the system change. Could this tired man,

concerned about his house, his home, and his way of life be recruited to rally under the banner of some distant goals?

#### The demand for comfort,

and the apprehension resulting from the possible loss of comfort renders any great call or recruitment hopeless from the outset. This is why not a single serious European party or movement defines distant goals today, they do not proclaim powerful, collective ideas to attract people. It would be absurd to do so in the conformist atmosphere of instant gratification.

The MDF has yet another, peculiar reason for being unable to point upwards at distant peaks. Programs for global salvation are not accepted from those who improvise, who have already been caught improvising.

The miserable aspect of the Hungarian situation is that other parties, other forces or movements do not even have this much going for them. For this reason society has learned by now to dismiss great institutions—such as the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court, and the parties, of course—and before long, society is going to acquiesce to existing without a head. A tragic lack of authority exists in this country. But there is not going to be any authority as long as the government governs based on improvised, supplemental actions.

Society, the silent majority, expected an independent, freely elected and Hungarian government to create independent, autonomous, and free Hungarian policies, and to do what society empowered it to do, instead of hiding behind obscure, empty slogans and paragraphs about democracy.

The first step toward fulfilling this expectation would have been a statement by the government as to what it wanted to do, and for the government to part with improvisations. Indeed, the electorate expected something difficult, almost impossible from the MDF government.

It should be obvious that a small country like ours, which was tossed to Stalin at Yalta with such ease, and which was let down so hideously in 1956, cannot be as independent as it would like to be. This is not only known to, but also instinctively felt by those who, to their misfortunes, were born as Hungarians. Nevertheless, there is a minimum level of effort to achieve independence that must be made primarily in the field of domestic policy and in setting basic national goals, and the people must be told if that effort cannot, or is not permitted to be made. The government has not made this minimum effort, and has not even made an attempt to explain why it has not. It was unable to give such an explanation because it could have done so only if the government had its own press and media, which breathed together with the government. But the government handed over the press and the media to the opposing forces as part of its first bad improvisation. Since then, however, it gives this constant, constrained excuse of not being able to achieve

its goals because the press is hostile and misinterprets or fails to report the government's intentions.

With this statement we have reached the most critical point in the history of the MDF and the governmental system change, the so-called Pact, the most controversial improvisation. As indicated before, the system change in Hungary consisted of two parts with disparate basic colors. We could call the first part the pink part, which lasted until the announcement of the 1990 election results. Today's ruling and opposition parties were formed during this period, when trilateral committees negotiated to amend the constitution, and it was during this period that the following question was raised: If there was going to be some kind of system change, to what extent would it be accompanied by a change in the elite and an exchange of the ruling strata. The reform communist government of Miklos Nemeth governed the country in those days. The Nemeth government, which compared favorably with all of its predecessors and therefore enjoyed broad public acceptance, had the courage to declare itself—at least seemingly and at least to a certain extent—independent from the ruling party. This was a consequence of the severing of bonds with Moscow.

Two endeavors characterized the Nemeth government. First: to proclaim and to force through the National Assembly of that time as many reform measures as possible, thus in part stealing the show from the next government and in part using these market-oriented measures as proof that the professionals writing these provisions had a place in a future government, regardless of its type. This leadership sought and cultivated relationships with the then evolving opposition parties—still called alternative parties at the time—and tried to infiltrate these parties. Second, but not second in importance: to secure maximum advantages, capital and position retention opportunities for its own management corps, its own institutional and economic leadership stratum. Ideology, and a high degree of flexibility were needed to accomplish this. The ideology evolved fast. It could be summarized as follows: "The future belongs to professionals." They explained to society that the professional core, party leadership, and the intertwined institutional and economic leadership stratum of the final decade of the Kadar era "no longer consisted of the kinds of thugs" that characterized the previous communist regimes, but instead, these people had a

#### "European"

outlook, that they had extensive Western connections.

The latter was true, indeed. While the stupid, old communists stuck to black hats and fur caps in Moscow, the clever KISZ [Communist Youth Organization] Central Committee reform communists grabbed Western business connections for themselves. By establishing a close alliance with the banking sphere, they also established conditions for the Hungarian economy and the future

Hungarian government—regardless of what kind of government that would be—that prevented any kind of deep-seated economic change.

During the final reform communist phase finances, the banking system, the National Bank, and Hungary's belonging to, and dependence on the international credit system became so definitive an element of the system change *that it cannot be changed*.

The agreement—which prescribed the maximum size of the Hungarian budget deficit—between the Nemeth government and the IMF was signed toward the end of December 1989, with leaders of the opposition parties as invited guests. MDF Chairman Jozsef Antall was also present at the ceremonies. He was supposed to note how much freedom of movement he would have between the limits of dollars promised and prescriptive IMF requirements, if by chance he became the head of government a few months later.

With this act, the last reform communist government—itsself significantly dependent on the descendants of the Kadar system and on its own banking system, which borrowed money abroad and distributed it at home during the era when the country lived on credit—essentially determined *the depth of the system change in Hungary*, should it occur.

Although IMF requirements concerning the budget and economic structural transformation do not expressly establish political requirements, they do, in essence, imply such requirements, because no society and no economy can be changed contrary to its financier's intentions. The IMF is the financier in this case, because without its signature no bank in the world would as much as talk to any Hungarian government, and the Hungarian economy would not be able to stand on its feet without continuously borrowing from these banks. Without these loans Hungary would not be able pay the interest on the already borrowed funds, and this was especially true in the past. Hungary receives no credit if it is unable to pay the interest, and Hungary collapses if it receives no credit. And what would amount to the same thing: Foreign investor interest would decline and no capital would flow into the economy.

Thus one can find nothing objectionable about the fact that the Nemeth government reached an agreement with the IMF by 1990, even though it knew that it would govern only until the end of the first quarter. Equally, no one can object to the fact that the then heir apparent MDF recognized this agreement, and that once in power, beginning in May 1990, the new government implemented the budget prepared by the previous communist government. This was probably an IMF requirement, and from a practical standpoint, nothing else could have been done.

Thus, from the standpoint of the Hungarian financial sphere, the system change meant staying in place without worries, making a smooth transition, and retaining all

previous influence. It meant understanding the processes, preserving and profiting from relations with Western capital, supporting the salvaging of comrades, and

**further concealing the things to be concealed.**

The process that took place was something like the process that had taken place in 1945 and 1946. At that time, the Interior Ministry and the political police—the only possible repressive organ in those days—had been grabbed away from the Smallholders party, the winner in the elections, and then used to crush democracy. In the ensuing 45 years the banking system and finances have acquired the kind of significance the police had in those days, and the preservation of this system provided the same kind of security for the Kadar era power elite and the nomenklatura in 1990, as the political police had provided in 1945-46. In those days Vorosilov's Allied Control Commission and the Red occupation army stood behind communist henchmen, murderers, and people who urinated in people's mouths and tore out their fingernails; today the IMF stands behind the financial elite of the era of the system change.

A small, but characteristic matter must be added to this story. In the 1980s, when the frequency of loan negotiations was on the increase, Vaci Street was often swept with reports from well-informed sources: "A delegation of bankers visited Hungary; before signing a loan agreement for this or that many millions of dollars, they stuck a note under the noses of Hungarian negotiators indicating that one or another person in the opposition should be granted a passport, that someone's harassment should be stopped, and so on and so forth." In other words: strictly financial negotiations were never devoid of direct politics. No one even imagined otherwise. It takes little political savoir faire to imagine that those who had the dollars may have prepared these lists in response to requests from the Hungarian negotiators. This was a heroic act at the time, a move against the hard core of the state party.

We need not go further from this point to understand that the old guard continues to have this opportunity as long as the leadership of the banks remains unchanged. We may find out some day what Hungarian society paid for those two years when they had not yet managed to get rid of Suranyi, the trustee of communist-liberal continuity. But of course his firing did not create order in the financial community, not in the least.

Every budget submitted thus far by the Antall government has remained within the 1989 coordinates, and the needs of the government and of the system change also had to remain consistent with conditions established by the IMF. For this reason, every budget debate becomes the embodiment of frenzy in the Hungarian National Assembly; before the government submits a budget to parliament it must first figure out a technique for adoption, because even the governing party representatives

are reluctant to concur with the budget. They sense that the figures are provided by a Finance Ministry that hates them.

These were the most essential processes prior to the elections. The only thing we must add to this is that the MDF did not enter the elections at the height of its strength. The popular referendum of 1989, the victory of the four yes votes almost tore apart the MDF and established virtually identical conditions of strength for both the MDF and the other two opposition parties. Gone was the self-confidence that characterized the MDF in the summer when it overwhelmingly won 14 races in interim elections prompted by five recalls and resignations, and when the only question was whether to accept the support offered by the rest of the opposition parties.

**The leadership became paralyzed by severe conflicts.**

Zoltan Biro and, to a certain extent, Sandor Csoori felt that the MDF should side with, and support Imre Pozsgay in the popular referendum that the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] had essentially forced in order to stop Pozsgay from becoming the president of the republic. Biro and Csoori felt Pozsgay deserved such support for publicizing the Lakitelek Statement at his own risk and for siding with the MDF at the Trilateral Negotiations. Besides, no one was able to compete with Pozsgay in prominence and popularity. Another group, represented by Csurka in the presidium, recognized Pozsgay's unquestionable merits but advocated that the MDF name its own presidential candidate. In the end, this position prevailed at the National Congress; a sweeping majority elected Lajos Fur to become the candidate for the president of the republic, but the Congress failed to develop a politically appropriate position regarding the popular referendum. We had our own candidate and therefore could not support the "four yes" votes. The communist successor parties supported one "no" and three "yes" votes. Had we advocated the same thing, we would have confirmed the lie the SZDSZ widely propagated in the press, namely, that we were communists. No witty solution came to anyone's mind, so we dispatched poor Denes Csengey to the television to announce our boycott. Everything turned against us. We had no press and no money, and we had only one truth: that the call for the popular referendum and the questions asked in the popular referendum involved a trick, that three of the four related questions were only lures. The fact that there were only 6,000 plus a few hundred more "four yes" votes than other combinations was a miracle, and this attests to the political wisdom of the Hungarian people.

The MDF's victory became complete in the second round of the elections. Success consisted of three elements. First and foremost: no other party was able to compete with us in addressing the Hungarian people, in serving the national values, and in embodying the traditional national centrist idea of the Hungarian people. This, in essence, reflected the success of the Lakitelek

Statement and the Lakitelek spirit. The second element of success: Only the MDF was able to present a new political leader like Jozsef Antall, to whom the country could be entrusted. The third element was the courage manifested by the MDF in daring to point out the bolshevik roots of the SZDSZ leadership, and to thereby arouse suspicion, a suspicion that proved to be correct, i.e., that behind all the vocal anticommunist talk there was an intent to salvage the left-wing nomenklatura.

This revelation, however, proved to be a dangerous weapon. The exposure made it possible to revive charges of anti-Semitism against the MDF. But this, too, has its own story. This issue must not, and cannot be avoided when analyzing the system change and the MDF's improvisations.

As early as

28 September

in 1987, the day after the Lakitelek camp meeting, THE NEW YORK TIMES published a commentary charging that the Lakitelek gathering had been nationalistic and anti-Semitic. Sandor Csoori, one of the founders, happened to be out there at the time, and the same charges also began pouring to his address. Csoori himself has already written about these events. It seemed that these charges were fueled by the fact that a few members of the democratic opposition who had played an important role at the previous joint meeting in Monor were not invited to Lakitelek.

In reality, however, the problem was that we dared to form *our own* organization. With that, an idea that had been cherished for so long in BESZELO and at certain offices of the Party headquarters had vanished: the idea of a future great, common "opposition" organization, to which we—the writers labeled as populists and other poor fellows—would deliver the masses, the middle stratum of society that paid attention to us, and the intelligentsia, while they would fill the leadership posts and retain the privilege of "professional" politicking, thus fully reassuring their friends and relatives who had become fully integrated with the communist system and who were nagged by doubts at that point.

We would have become the front men and the fall guys, thus making it possible for them to carry out the farce of a showy system change without causing the ruling strata the slightest concern.

But the MDF was based precisely on a recognition that the various strata of the Hungarian people that had hung around outside the fences of power and had never before been organized, needed their own organization *by all means*, one that was not formed to serve some international interest group or to salvage those in power, but instead to directly resolve the vital issues of the Hungarian people.

### The charge of anti-Semitism

has followed the MDF from the first moment on. The government, too, has been forced to continuously defend itself against this charge.

The idea that the MDF included anti-Semites was not invented by the democratic opposition; they only inherited it from idea-men operating in Aczel's agit-prop division.

It is enough to tell this story beginning in 1945. At that time, following the German occupation, a significant number of Hungarian Jews returning to a terribly decimated Hungary, or daring to re-emerge from hiding, envisioned the communist party as the sole guarantee for starting a new life and for preventing a return of conditions similar to those of 1944. This expectation was based not only on the fact that every member of the Moscovite quartet that had grabbed power had been Jewish, but also on the financial support provided to the Left in Hungary, to the communist remnants, by the former liberal, bourgeois Jewry. They merged; it was not at all a rarity to find communist youths in upper bourgeois families spending part of their monthly allowance for communist party purposes.

Quite naturally, the Rakosi system that settled in and soon turned into a wild beast, robbed the Jews, too, of their private property, and did not exempt a person from deportation merely because of Jewish origin, as long as an AVO [State Security Division] official cast his eyes on the villa of such a person. Following the example provided by Stalin, Rakosi would also have ventured to arrange for a Jewish physicians' trial, but nevertheless the bottom line was: The Jews concluded that a period of emergency could not be expected, there was no threat, and the Rakosi system had to be accepted.

A new situation presented itself after 1956. Tito and Khrushchev decided that in the aftermath of the Rakosi era, the front lines of the post-revolution regime could not visibly include Jews. It might be easier to consolidate the rebellious Hungarians this way. But even aside from that, they were fed up with the Jewish reformers who had rallied around Imre Nagy before. They spoiled the overall picture and endangered the prospects of reprisal. These Hungarian martyrs rest in Parcel No. 301 today. They are Istvan Angyal and his associates, who died as heroes worthy of the rest of the martyrs of the nation, and whose self-sacrifice unfortunately did not suffice for acquiescence.

But there was yet another warning Kadar had to recognize, in addition to Khrushchev's and Tito's basic consideration. When the then incumbent American President Eisenhower was confronted with the difficult decision of whether or not to intervene in the Hungarian revolution and to thereby interfere in the "internal affairs" of the Soviet sphere of interest—contrary to the Potsdam Accord and despite the Suez crisis that weighed far more heavily on his mind—his decision to give the Soviets a free hand to drown in blood the Hungarian revolution was made easier by the leaders of the Jewish

World Congress of New York, who appeared before Eisenhower and pointed out to him that Jews were being killed in Budapest.

Undoubtedly, a few dozen leading AVO floggers—some particularly evil assistants to the executioners Gabor Peter and Mihaly Farkas—were in great danger in Budapest, and the feeling of security provided by the Rakosi system was also threatened. But there was not even a trace of a pogrom or of anti-Semitism.

Accordingly, Kadar also had to be responsive to this other expectation of no less gravity, and he was indeed responsive to it. He obviously must have received reminders from Moscow, too, to observe these rules. The main blood lines of the AVO remained intact, while culture and public relations were placed in the hands of Szirmai and Aczel. On the surface, everyone presented himself as a populist, a worker and a peasant, new resumes were written, and without excluding anyone, the Jewish martyrs of the revolution had to be forgotten together with the rest of the martyrs, and together, we had to be silent and continue remaining silent about all this.

In the end, Hungarian Jewry developed a greater  
**sense of being at home**

in the Kadar system than ever before. The fact that an overwhelming part of the nation's non-Jewish majority had simply forgotten about the Jewish question, or, as in the case of the younger generation, had not even learned about the Jewish question, contributed to this situation. While Romania sold out its Jewish citizens causing substantial damage to culture and civilization in Transylvania and in all of Romania, only a negligible number of people emigrated from Hungary to Israel after 1956. In this sickly era that outlived its own time, Budapest and Vienna were the two major cities where the Jewry had a say and could exert overt or covert influence, and where it could be a decisive element.

Both the Aczel-type liberals of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] and the members of the democratic opposition who maintained close communications with them felt that this hegemonic situation was threatened when the MDF was established. If a newly formed organization's leadership did not include a delegate from this group, so that there was no certainty that a signal would be given if any steps were contemplated that threatened the hegemonic position of Hungarian Jewry, then such an organization was dangerous. Accordingly, both the party of those days and the democratic opposition considered the MDF the chief danger.

The fact that the day after Lakitelek a writing that analyzed the MDF's anti-Semitism—in reality a warning threat—was published in New York must not be attributed solely to the good connections and efficiency of the democratic opposition. This kind of action required cooperation with the already described former banking connections, with the consulate and with secret channels that had been developed much earlier.

The MDF was at its height in 1988 and 1989, until the last quarter of that year. Everyone regarded as a member of the opposition appeared at functions organized at the Jurta Theater, party headquarters listened to what was said there both directly and from recordings, the entire country was paying attention and everyone was able to convince himself that not even a trace of anti-Semitism could be found either in the statements or in the way the program was put together. At the same time, the MDF headquarters staff repulsed every attempt to unite or to join; the MDF did not join the *Network*, it continued going its own way.

Three serious *merger and integration* attempts were made in those days. The MDF brushed off the attempt made by a group that kept busy dealing with irrelevant issues, called the Network for Democratic Initiatives. A clumsily disguised party action calling for the renewal of the New March Front was also swept away. In contrast, however, it was impossible to evade the unifying, rational and useful endeavor made by the Opposition Roundtable. Although with difficulty, the MDF was able to preserve its independence, its position of being the largest opposition and democratic force in this effort; nevertheless, as a result of this, in the eyes of the public the MDF lost a lot because even somewhat well-informed people identified the MDF with the opposition groups that sat around the table. Thereafter it had become impossible to convey separate viewpoints and the MDF's own character to society, and impossible to expose the SZDSZ. It would have been impossible to explain to a society that had consistently been misled for 40 years that the most notorious anticommunist party was a group composed of the nomenklatura that ensured continuous transition.

The rift occurred when the SZDSZ and FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] refused to sign an agreement reached as a result of joint negotiations concerning amendments to the constitution. At that point the SZDSZ-FIDESZ group, and the brain trust behind it, realized that these two parties would not be able to attach themselves to the MDF, i.e., that a party billed as the great "opposition" party—one that would make Hungarian society swallow the idea that it is opposed to communism, while in reality ensuring the smoothest possible salvaging of the nomenklatura—could not be established. From that point on the MDF became public enemy No. 1, and the left-wing tried with all its might to discredit the MDF and shrink it into the smallest possible party before the elections.

Hungarian society registered the reburial ceremonies of 16 June 1989 as the end of the Kadar era, and as the celebration of its deliverance. That it was. The audience did not worry much about the identity of the speakers, where they came from, what they had done before, and what they had to do with the whole thing.

The function of organizing this event was grabbed by reform communists who had once rallied around Imre Nagy, who had survived the Imre Nagy trial, and who, by



then, comprised the Committee for Historical Justice [TIB]. They made an agreement with the government and with the party to make the ceremonial arrangements, to designate the speakers and to provide for the character and the mood of the event. Undoubtedly, they were the ones who invented the entire funeral—for themselves.

The MDF, the only organization capable of acting at the time, which had performed the lion's share of organizing previous mass movements—Saint Laszlo Day on 27 June 1988 and the Transylvania demonstration with 250,000 people—performed only an auxiliary role in this ceremony, its role being limited to wearing arm bands and maintaining order. In agreeing to this role the MDF undoubtedly became the fall guy, but the government and the TIB had presented everyone with an accomplished fact, based on an agreement that had been reached behind the scenes. Members of the TIB had been in prison with Imre Nagy, therefore they were the ones entitled to organize the event and play the leading role.

Was everyone aware at the time that the speakers standing in front of the coffins were providing the basic tone of the future political system, and that only those would have political and moral capital in the future whom the crowd was able to see in front of itself, and the country through a television broadcast? No, people were not aware of this. They were simply pleased with the fact that all this had become possible. When this writer raised his voice to declare that at least Tibor Meray—whose lies during the Korean war, bloodthirsty communist conduct, and functioning at SZABAD NEP was repulsive despite all his subsequent atonement as a dissident—should not be allowed to speak at Imre Nagy's grave, he was of course uniformly attacked, and was of course declared an anti-Semite.

At that time Sandor Racz was permitted to deliver a speech in addition to Bela Kiraly, Miklos Vasarhelyi, Arpad Goncz, Viktor Orban and Imre Mecs. The speech delivered by Sandor Racz, the man from the Central Workers Council who had served a long prison sentence and who had been strictly guarded and persecuted throughout the entire Kadar era, was the best and the toughest address. Quite naturally, he was attacked for that speech. Viktor Orban, too, became known as a result of his speech; he, too, had some tough words to say. Did he really think that way in those days?

Perhaps in part due to his own fault, after falling into several undignified situations, Sandor Racz was excluded from the political arena. On the other hand, nothing characterizes better the sense of historical justice of the rest than the fact that all of them are among those who torpedoed the Zetenyi-Takacs law, which called for doing a modest amount of justice.

In other words, one could ask what the reburial was actually meant for, with its sixth coffin of modest significance, which permitted the country to honor the nameless victims?

It was meant to be the day when the reform communists rewrote their own history. With their heads lowered, Nemeth and Pozsgay jointly brought along a wreath, while Vasarhelyi, Goncz and Bela Kiraly received salutations. From above.

And the MDF group of organizers burst out with joy for having been able to participate in tolling the

#### system's death bell.

They were active down below, of course, down in the crowd, among the people. This was followed by the so-called Dunagate scandal, which had no practical significance whatsoever except for the removal of Interior Minister Horvath, who tended to support Pozsgay, and for providing huge publicity to the SZDSZ-FIDESZ duo. *By accident*, the material fell into the hands of FIDESZ's Zoltan Lovas and the Black Box; and they were able to get into one of the closely guarded vaults of the Interior Ministry, *by accident*. Behind the Hollywood style story one could even get a glimpse at the division within the successor party. Due to his relations with the MDF, Pozsgay became increasingly unreliable both within his own party and in the government, and friends who shared his views no longer welcomed his ambitions to become president of the republic. He, too, had to be squeezed out somehow, together with the MDF.

The press—still influenced in those days by the party and the government—generously relinquished itself to the SZDSZ and made critical remarks about the socialists—although never reaching the essence of issues. They used unconstrained words in particular with reference to the distant past, to Stalinism and to comrades who had already been thrown overboard (Czinege). Not once did they mention Gyorgy Aczel and his group, or raise doubts about the fitness of the SZDSZ-FIDESZ to provide leadership.

Interestingly, all this was in harmony with a chapter of the *Social Contract*, published in 1987 by BESZELO. This chapter listed the main culprits of the Kadar System. From Biszku to Marosan and in reverse. Only one name was left out: that of Gyorgy Aczel.

At this point Pozsgay took perhaps the only firm step in his life; he established the Television Supervisory Committee and removed TV News and the program A HET from the hands of the opposing camp, and entrusted both to G. Istvan Palfy. Palfy came under cross fire from that point on, and he continues to be attacked even today. That was the beginning of the media war.

By then, it had become clear to people possessing an appropriate volume of information that in reality two sides were wrestling each other here: *the national center*, which includes a Christian and a populist wing as well as a trend that was committed to the socialist ideals of the former peasant party, and a *left-wing bloc*, whose vociferous anticommunist radicalism could not be outdone, but which, in the final analysis, wanted to maintain the continuous rule that had existed ever since 1945. This, of course, included a need to ensure the influence of the

Jewry, but of greatest importance was the preservation of financial positions and the maintenance of an opportunity to hand down power.

This was a huge task to perform, and they came quite close to performing it. Within a rather short period of time they had to organize a national party composed of largely unknown people from BESZELO, actually a group composed of members of the Budapest intelligentsia fundamentally in tune with Marxism, and to make people believe that they would be or could be the ones who would lead the country after the downfall of socialism. Meanwhile, it was not permissible to fully destroy the MSZP's [Hungarian Socialist Party] and the MSZMP's authority either, although Pozsgay, believed to be the chief mover behind change, had to be discredited. The MDF had to be whipped jointly with him, and he had to be whipped together with the MDF. There were contradictions, confusion, and chaos, and nowhere could one find a ray of hope. In fact, 40 percent of the voters stayed away from the ballot boxes as a result, because they could not understand anything of what was going on.

This marked the beginning of portraying the MDF as an assembly of boorish individuals; this was the time when the story gained credence that political expertise, and, in general, European knowledge could be found in the SZDSZ; and this was the time when precise exclusionary games began, all of which was supposed to end in the failure of the MDF.

The hard core of the SZDSZ alone would have fallen far short of being able to accomplish all this, regardless of the bolshevik centralizing iron discipline these people worked with, not to mention FIDESZ' youthful team, which would fit into a locker room. To accomplish all this, help was needed from the entire state party staff and its data provider activities, as well as effective international support from the banking system. American supporters, headed by Soros, who had been called in earlier and had assumed the form of a foundation, did not spare any money to achieve this great goal. In the election campaign that had started the SZDSZ-FIDESZ had far more money available to it than the MDF. The press built them up, and impeded the MDF. Was all this done for free?

Despite all this,

#### **the left-wing bloc could not be sure of itself.**

Attempts to discredit the MDF abroad did not produce 100 percent results. Although during their journey to America Antall and Jeszenszky had to prove to very many organizations that the MDF was not anti-Semitic and that Hungarian Jewry would not be threatened at all should the MDF take power, in the end the impossible occurred: We managed to prove that we were not what we truly were not. Thus, albeit with reservations, American practical politics, too, accepted the MDF. There were no problems with having ourselves accepted in Europe, and the European

connections of Antall and his group soon produced support from the Christian democratic and peoples parties, and from centrists and conservatives.

Virtually the entire membership of the MDF at that time thrust itself into the election struggle with an incredible willpower, dedication and readiness to sacrifice, and created an election campaign out of virtually nothing. The human word was our only weapon.

We played our ace trump card, and introduced our single responsible politician, Antall Jozsef, at the right time. The left-wing bloc was unable to run anyone against him. Accordingly, they had to give thought to ways in which they would resolve the situation after the elections. Janos Kis declared at a Szombathely rally in December 1989 for the first time that the SZDSZ would regard a coalition with the MDF as possible, provided that the MDF got rid of Csurka, its right wing. Even though at that point the remarks on having a "populist-national backbone" and on the "dwarf minority" had yet to be uttered, charges of anti-Semitism increased terribly. Janos Kis was not interested in the extent to which his statement resembled some of Rakosi's utterances in 1945 and 1946 encouraging the Smallholders Party to isolate itself from its right wing, from the "reactionaries." (This wish materialized later in the form of shackles and prisons, bullets and tearing off fingernails, of course....)

*Dividing the MDF* and forming a coalition with the weakened organization thereafter was part of the original idea. To accomplish that they had to create a situation in which the party itself would be forced to part with the man portrayed as an anti-Semite also in the international arena, and to enter into coalition with the thus weakened remnant, from a superior position from the outset. This, of course, required, and still requires the data bases available to Aczel's staff.

Many may regard the frequent mention of this name almost as a symptom of mania. But the truth is that anyone wanting to be involved in politics in today's Hungary must be familiar with the terrain.

Aczel's network is the most shrewdly and most thoroughly composed political, economic and financial mixture in recent Hungarian history. Its international contacts extend in every direction of the compass, and nothing can happen in Hungary without it. Through his men, Aczel not only had insight into the secret services and domestic counterintelligence: these organizations were under Aczel's direct command even at times when he was seemingly removed to the background within his own party. He stuck to Kadar like a leech and was thus able to influence the most important decisions. His method of operation was to ruthlessly make an intellectual—a scientist or an artist—incapable of functioning; then, after the intellectual broke down, or if torment no longer produced any political benefits, "he propped him up under the arm" and helped him "against the left-wing of the party" to receive an opportunity for creative work.

In the background it was Aczel who had the shackles put on people, he was the one who directed prohibitions, but he was also the one who handed out decorations. The machinery continues to work today, and the army of people indebted to him is endless.

(Some day, in more peaceful times, somebody may describe the way a certain team of parachutists moves about in the body of Hungarian society. As needed, this team appears on occasion as the Galilei Circle, on other occasions it becomes a periodical for liberal thinkers, and still at other times it appears as Bela Kun's and Tibor Szamuely's terrorist lads, then turns into a Moscovite emigration headquartered in Vienna and Berlin, then fondles to death Attila Jozsef in Hungary. This team always appears in a changed form, and always condemns the previous form, while it continues its activities. As a result of this they are present at every major social change. But this does not belong here, at this time.)

Sawing the MDF into pieces is always among the specified goals. Many times, the organization itself revealed some cracks in its own fortifications, where it was possible to enter. The SZDSZ and the excluded state party boys have tried to acquire leadership positions in every other party. The Social Democratic Party appeared to be most promising. Haraszti's and Bihari's men placed the social democrats into a vise.

In the popular referendum the Smallholders Party sided with the SZDSZ, but the eager SZDSZ leadership—intoxicated by its victory—made the mistake of leaving out the Smallholders from their success. They looked down upon them and misjudged the results they could expect. They regarded the leaders of the Smallholders as gullible, and as persons who could be siphoned in at any time. They did not grasp the mobilizing force of demand for land, which created a strong, almost centrist party out of actually nonexistent smallholders and out of older Hungarian people who remembered the events of 1945.

#### Were they blinded by Trotsky's contempt for muzhiks?

And then, when the first round of elections proved that they had failed to achieve their goal—because, although by a small margin, the MDF had still remained the strongest party—they once again began using the Opposition Roundtable scheme. A tremendous pressure descended upon the MDF, and primarily on Jozsef Antall, who was supposed to form a cabinet, not to dare to leave the SZDSZ out of the calculations. The press uniformly demanded a grand coalition. They presented a hundred arguments to prove that the MDF would not be capable of governing on its own.

But these were only the pressures exercised in public. We might learn about warnings and demands presented by the above-mentioned groups through official state political channels only when the time for writing memoirs arrives. With the exception of one case.

After the second round of elections, when Antall became aware of the results and made a public statement to the effect that he would form a coalition with the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats, and that he would leave out the SZDSZ as well as FIDESZ, *the deposits at the Hungarian National Bank plummeted to half their previous volume in the course of a single week.*

Overnight, the country found itself at the brink of bankruptcy. State banks and large banks which previously maintained \$1.5 billion at the Hungarian National Bank as a sign of confidence, suddenly felt that their money was not in the right place. Although it was true that Bulgaria declared its insolvency just about that time, that alone would not have sufficed to suddenly shake confidence in the Hungarian banking system. *This transaction must have been directed, or at least suggested by someone from somewhere, for some reason.*

Let us not guess, and let us not raise suspicions. The facts speak for themselves. The Antall government was not even installed at the time, and the MDF would have hardly had any means to prevent this situation. But the Aczel banking system was in office, and operated at full strength: the network that had the passport lists placed on the table in earlier days, the one that had most to lose if the MDF took office without being tripped up first.

What they had failed to achieve with the people's front bluff of the New March Front, with the Opposition Roundtable, with the division of the MDF, with the grand coalition demanded by the press—and echoed by the public—they *succeeded in accomplishing through coercing* the sudden withdrawal of \$800 million in the last minute as a result of this concentrated attack, these threats, and who knows what else that had taken place.

Negotiations concerning a pact that had been going on previously between the SZDSZ and the MDF accelerated, and even before a government was formed, one of the most contradictory, and in its effects most damaging, agreements of Hungarian political history was reached. This agreement interfered with the life of Hungarian society just at the moment when the greatest need would have been to simply receive from "up above" and transplant into practice that which the Hungarian people had had a chance to envision at last, in the course of free elections.

Much has been said about this agreement in the past, but usually only in a superficial way. To begin with, it has never been presented as a constrained, moreover coerced political retreat that resulted from a \$800 million clubbing after a series of attempted penetrations. It is true that from the standpoint of public law the agreement appears to be balanced: The fact that the post of the president of the republic was yielded and that media chiefs would be appointed on a consensual basis seems sufficiently offset by the agreements on the reduced number of laws requiring a two-thirds majority vote, on the approval process for amendments to the constitution, and on the acceptance of the idea of a collective

nonconfidence motion concerning the government and particularly the prime minister. However, this balance has become lopsided as a result of disadvantageous consequences.

Doubtless, it would have become practically impossible to govern had there been a two-thirds majority vote required for the adoption of the budget. A situation similar to that in Poland could have presented itself, in which a fragmented National Assembly would be helpless, and thus the government, too, would only manage to struggle along. Sooner or later the consequence of a situation like this would have been a call for new elections, and the outcome of that would have been highly doubtful. It is unlikely that the MDF miracle would have repeated itself.

Accordingly, an identical number of arguments could be made

#### for the pact

and against the pact. And yet, the pact produced tragic consequences, primarily from the standpoint of the system change. Only one of the parties to the agreement was what the MDF was. It negotiated and agreed to the bargain as a force empowered to govern, one that intended to implement the system change its own way. The method of changing the system was supported by a majority. In contrast, the other party entered into the agreement not in order to accomplish a system change, but to sustain the conditions of power that had continuously existed ever since 1945, and to slow down the system change. This was clear only to a few at the time. That side had lost the elections and yet acquired the highest public office, and from that point on it depended solely on that side just how, and consistent with what interests they would take advantage of that office.

Namely, as a result of the pact the MDF yielded a significant part of practical power to the narrow group it had defeated, whose unification proposals it had been able to stave off even at the roundtable. The extent to which this matter has to do with exercising power and with the depth and manner of the system change is best demonstrated by Arpad Goncz's refusals to affix his signature, by the advantages the nomenklatura derived in the course of privatization, and by the communist contamination of certain staffs.

Accordingly, the pact must not be perceived as only one of the improvisations of the MDF, of the government, and, in particular, of Jozsef Antall, because viewed from the other side, the pact was a timely step in the continuous exercise of power that has prevailed ever since 1945, a step by which this continuous power integrated, smuggled, or—it is best to tell the truth—forced its own parachutist troop into the Hungarian system change, which had been made possible by the collapse of the Soviet system.

Yielding the office of the president of the republic would have caused no particular problem had it been yielded to

a real opposition party, one that wanted a system change but in a different way. But as it was, by giving this post to Arpad Goncz, whom the SZDSZ hard core controlled, the pact made it above all possible to subjugate the independence of the system change and the unrestricted commitment to Hungarian national interests.

The goal was not to change the system, but to secure the most important personal interests of those whose continuous rule has prevailed since 1945. The nomenklatura is the only real winner as a result of the pact. Neither the SZDSZ membership nor the MDF voters understood anything about the essence of this matter. Most likely, not even those who negotiated the pact understood this, all they felt was a terrible pressure. In addition, they were justified in pinning hopes on the power of personal and friendly commitments, on the ability of a common past to bring decency out of people. As we know, this kind of attitude is strictly prohibited in politics.

How could anyone have come up with this idea? There was Arpad Goncz of 1956 who had been imprisoned, there were the managers of the samizdat boutique whose vilification had been vividly described by the press and who had exposed the Dunagate scandal at a time when the government was still communist, there were the people who had dared to stand up against internal counterintelligence forces known for their toughness—lacking proof, and short of substantial press and television coverage, how could anyone have attempted to convey to society the truth recognized only by a few.

Doing so would have been a hopeless effort. One had to wait until all this was unquestionably proven by the actions of the president of the republic and of the hard core of the SZDSZ. Proof?

After arbitrarily extending his authority, in his capacity as commander in chief of the army Arpad Goncz prevented the army from using its vehicles and its tow trucks to remove from the bridges taxi drivers who had violated the public order, and who had organized themselves to topple the government.

Later, at the request of the government, the Constitutional Court declared that in times of peace the president of the republic was not a superior officer in the army's chain of command, i.e., that he had no authority to review what the government and the minister of defense had ordered, and mainly, that he had no authority to back an unconstitutional, illegal coup.

By then, however, we had already gotten

#### past the amnesty,

an amnesty the government had proposed, generously excusing the president who had made a mistake, and providing safe conduct to organized teams that had blockaded bridges and main arteries. This generosity, which of course also covered up some weakness, did not result in a more reasonable attitude on part of the president and those behind him; rather, what followed

was another unconstitutional slap in the face: a strike at the constitutional order and the public humiliation of the government. Based on a law adopted by a majority of the National Assembly, the government wanted to appoint three vice presidents to the Radio and three to the Television. The candidates were selected so that they would also be acceptable to the opposition parties. The president refused to sign the letters of appointment on the grounds that the prospective vice presidents would scuttle the illegally and illegitimately structured *intendant system*, which served as an accessory to anti-government sentiments and to the preservation of safety features built into the pact to protect the nomenklatura. Goncz said no, because the communist, reform communist, liberal and radical members of the nomenklatura, the liaisons between Paris, New York and Tel Aviv had ordered him to do so.

Was this part of the pact? Definitely so, from the standpoint of one side.

Encouraged by its successful performance in 1990, after insinuating itself into the power structure on a large scale, the nomenklatura changed its goals.—The government is weak, the system change has, in essence, failed to materialize, the time has come to blame the government and the MDF for failing to achieve what the nomenklatura had succeeded in preventing. Dissatisfaction in the country is on the rise, all we have to do is to fuel dissatisfaction, well then, let's do it!

Jozsef Antall's health has its ups and downs, virtually 100 percent of the press has been taken over, and the world is preoccupied with senseless wars—what should we be waiting for? Even the example of the Serbian communists proves that virtually anything can be done with impunity; therefore, the beachhead must be broadened, we must prove to society that this government is worse than ours was, it is not in charge of anyone; therefore, by scuttling the coalition majority we must knock the government out of power even before the elections.

They assigned this task to the demagogue Jozsef Torgyan, who has been capable of making the most out of dissatisfaction. Torgyan's travelling circus was touring the country on funds provided by large entrepreneurs from the MSZMP and KISZ headquarters. Torgyan, the populist and extreme right-wing demagogue of yesterday, suddenly became an important person whose every utterance had to be reported accurately. And Torgyan did, indeed, make a harsh anti-government statement every day.

This was the time when the alliance between the SZDSZ and the MSZP had to be tightened. The SZDSZ had nothing whatsoever to hide by then, even its own followers recognized its true face; conflicts within the party heightened, and the core from the countryside—the betrayed and misled core—that rallied around Tolgyessy had great difficulty in acting liberal and persuading itself to stay together.

The full discrediting of the MDF and

#### the open mockery of Hungarian values

began. The internationalist leaders of the nomenklatura staff discovered that if they let the MDF retain the hard-fought for privilege of serving national values, the bases of respect constructed even before the system change, the love of Hungarians beyond our borders—in brief, if it let the MDF keep the national-Christian-center—then the resurrection of the MDF was possible. For this reason, a volley had to be fired at everything that was national, populist and Hungarian. Traditions had to be discredited, common treasures had to be thrown away, everything that was created by the hands of the people had to be declared outdated, and everyone who dared to declare himself Hungarian had to be humiliated and cast out of his job. Unbridled terror began at the newspapers, at the television and in every place where professing to be Hungarian could be part of the operations. Education, upbringing, the ministry itself and the minister himself; religious life, the churches, the return of church property, the functioning of parochial schools; compensation, credit policies, the irregularities of obtaining credit and of the tax system, and the hindering of the Existence loan and Start loan funds;—all this is only an incomplete and sketchy listing of all the clashes the government must bleed from and recover from each and every day.

What else could a humiliated, poor government without means do? It manufactures ideas, improvises, spins, retreats, proclaims flexible disengagement, throws in its successful international relations, amends laws, seeks allies, courts anyone it can, strikes hard at its own following just to silence the opposing side, listens and falls silent, swallows the insults and wipes the filth off its face.

Lastly, we must assess the pact itself. The pact produced fatal consequences insofar as the depth of the system change was concerned; society's sense of justice not only remained unsatisfied but was also trampled on. By now, public thinking has deteriorated to a point where the misinformed masses prefer not to hear about doing justice. Time is passing, crimes are soon to reach the statute of limitations in a real sense, in the souls of the people. At the same time, we must also recognize that those who were forced to enter into the pact must not be held responsible for the fatal character of the pact, because they, like Artur Gorgey at Vilagos, could hardly have done otherwise, because even then the overpowering force was terrible. Instead, the primary culprits were those who took advantage of this opportunity and who failed to reveal, and to this date refuse to permit revelation of—this is why we have a media war!—their real faces, the fact that they represent a power factor that has continuously ruled ever since 1945, that they are the representatives of a power network that changes its face, color and vocabulary, who—like the eminent bolsheviks they are—regard power as the ultimate goal.

The members of the MDF team who consummated the pact—and these are far from being the same people who composed the MDF presidium at that time—could be condemned only for having done little to unveil this situation, because they did not have the courage to expose the other side even after a series of kicks was leveled at them.

The noise made by the press after it publicized Imre Konya's thesis, which had been written for internal use only, was typical. Konya had been involved in consummating the pact, so panic set in because he might begin to tell stories.

The opposite side has been exposed by midway between the two elections. Although both the MDF and the government are bleeding from a thousand wounds and are unable to win even a local election even if they run ministers as candidates, society is still rather highly enlightened considering the excessive power the Left and the nomenklatura wield in the press and in making publicity. To be exact: the view that appears to be the present opinion of society does not represent the final judgment of society over matters. Although the people's emotions have cooled off toward a hesitant, perfidious MDF that makes promises, and toward a weak government that can be ridiculed, they also recognize by now that they are the subjects of a grand delusion, and have a hunch that someone wants them to accept something that could seal the fate of future generations.

Fortunately, the disillusioned Marxists wearing jockey caps

#### **lack a sense of proportion,**

and this is sensed by Hungarian eyes and ears. In the beginning, the communists felt that the entire 1,000 year history of Hungary had to be wiped out; later on they began to pick and choose from among past events and phenomena, and declared as their antecedents whatever they presented as "progressive," and hung the sign "reactionary" on the nooses of people whom they would have hung anyway.

*Today's so-called liberals, and, in general, those who call themselves the Left, would like to maintain today's freedom, openness and democracy at the 1945 level, a time when the entire Hungarian intelligentsia, with its right-wing sentiments, the truly democratic-minded middle class, the populists and the members of the historical class could all be stigmatized in one breath as "right-wing" and "reactionary" because of a handful of German agents and Arrow Cross villains, and a time when it was possible to grab power irrespective of the outcome of elections. This is why the idea of a "Christian course" was thrown into public consciousness, and this is why they were not deterred from renewing the most reactionary Romanian terminology: "Horthy-fascism." This is where they want to draw the line. At the same time, however, a truly independent, new national renewal must have available its own entire history as a foundation to be continued and to provide lessons. A*

team that murmurs its own Marxist theories—which have already been torn apart a thousand times—but meanwhile also wants to acquire power, must not be allowed to stand in the way of a sense of national continuity and self-identity; it must not be allowed to declare one era in Hungarian history something not to be talked about, to be erased, while it composes hundreds of songs in praise of another era, which it regards as its own antecedent. It is not true that everything that happened prior to 1867, before the great Galician immigration, was "romantic," was the history of another nation "that is not yet real" and can be forgotten; no, just the reverse! Everything going back to Arpad and even further is important, because everything that is there, including the Kuns, the Slovaks, the Romanians, the Saxons, the Schwabians and the Jews, contributed to what we are today, and this is the only foundation upon which we can build a future, independence, and survival.

#### **This is nationalism?**

What a laugh!

But it's also something to cry about. The way this emerges in mass culture and in TV-show trivia, in vulgarity and in helplessness, in the lack of knowledge of the Hungarian language and in the deliberate destruction of the language, in the bombardment of eardrums—all this actually amounts to the erasure of Hungarian consciousness, to the destruction of character in order to create conditions in which it is possible to rule over Hungarians without any trouble. And surely, all this flows from the pact.

All this is because a new-born awareness, the naming of names, or, more bluntly, exposure has failed to materialize.

The MDF, the agent of the majority, the sole, last, weak and hesitant trustee of the historical Hungarian nation reached an agreement with a party, knowing that those who controlled that party and others in its background were the false prophets, the representatives of a permanent presence built into Hungarian independence as a result of the Red Army occupation, a lost war, and, naturally! the crimes of the previous era. The MDF did this without the knowledge of its electorate, and with this agreement, with this forced, extorted agreement that was indispensable from the standpoint of governance, the MDF made it possible [for that force] to continue performing its stage play for the Hungarian people freed from the Russian-Soviet yoke, and it made it possible for that disguised, selfish organization, which shows no respect for Hungarian values, to expand, to inundate the field of public information, to grab most of the opportunities for acquiring property, and finally, as a sum total of all this, to function as if it were what it purports to be.

This is why the people feel that no system change has occurred, and this is why they turn away from, and almost manifest hatred toward the MDF, because they expected the MDF to accomplish this, precisely this—a substantive system change.

The MDF itself became pulverized while suppressing these facts. It is psychologically impossible to find excuses for years to explain why one does not strike back, why one tolerates the defamation and exclusion of his family and his people, why one puts on a good face in responding to a fundamentally Mafioso activity. One can only become consumed by being two-faced, by being in this state of

**mental reservation.**

During the four decades of socialism, at least 600,000 of the 800,000 party members had to conceal themselves, and to a smaller or greater extent the entire nation would not admit even to itself what it thought of the whole thing. The system change should have brought about a kind of freedom in which everyone could rid himself of mental reservations, and in which everyone could say what he thought of people and phenomena. The pact mentality is at fault insofar as it made possible the continuation of prohibitions, the fact that some people could not say what they had on their minds, because some facts were concealed exactly by those whom they trusted most.

(I observed an interesting phenomenon during the initial months of the change: Never before had people hinted so much at the functioning of the wiretapping system as at that time, never before had so many interesting conversation topics been derailed as at that time by someone saying "this is not something we discuss over the telephone." One wonders why? Primarily and obviously, because people were no longer afraid of being punished for their offensive remarks as they had been in the past, and besides, a statement like this also passed as a good joke. But beyond all this, in this remark that also evidenced fear, lurked the assumption that certain apparatuses of the past system had not ceased to exist, that they were present somewhere in the background, and that even though the old Soviet power no longer stood behind them, some great force continued to ensure their security: they function, they are here on top of us, they prohibit things, they wait and then they will pounce on us.)

National liberalism is a basic element of the MDF. The populist way of thinking would be inconceivable without Deak and Eotvos, Szechenyi and Kossuth, without the objectivity of Zsigmond Kemeny, and without the radicalism of Endre Ady; without them the dual, two-way track between the great centers of the Hungarian spirit would not have been built. Accordingly, one must not even begin to debate whether there is room for the existence of national liberalism along with the liberalism that has no adjective, because only national liberalism is based on valid premises. Accordingly, competing with parties that call themselves liberal is a political mistake, doing so is the product of pact mentality and submissiveness because it reinforces in the public mind something that is not true, something that is a disguise only, that those who call themselves liberals are indeed liberals.

Come on! The SZDSZ-FIDESZ acquired full power in Budapest. They could manage the city in a liberal fashion. Are they doing so? Is there any other place in the country where there is so much exclusion, so much intolerance and so much refusal to accept criticism as in Demszky's capital? What is this bare-chested, "shoot at me!" liberalism good for? They are shooting there anyway, without hesitation.

And finally, nothing is more important to a society undergoing transformation than

**to be fully capable of recognizing things.**

This is particularly important and indispensable in a society that wants to get out of the darkness of Soviet communism and to see the light, a society that had been deliberately blinded for decades and dominated as a result of this blinding, by falsifying its value system and by withering away its consciousness.

Accordingly, the final assessment of the Pact is as follows: Great political wisdom manifested itself in making this pact, which was forced into being, but in its afterlife it produced and continues to produce tragic consequences from the standpoint of the Hungarian people.

It destroyed the Hungarian people's ability to see through (alien) people, it concealed the intolerable injustices of privatization, it helped return Hungarian public communications into the hands of those who had usurped it during the Kadar-Aczel era, and finally, it *disarmed the MDF, and the MDF became surrounded as a result.*

The task to be performed by the government and by what remains of the MDF flows from the above: There is only one possible way to survive and to resolve the vital issues of the Hungarian people: *We must break free.*

We must not—and cannot—dispute that those on the opposite side, on the other end of the "Line," have the exact same legitimacy in parliament as we do, because like us, they, too, were elected, and therefore they, too, are entitled to everything that flows from being elected. Instead, we must guard against a situation in which the Hungarian people elect them again without knowing where they come from, who they really are, and what they want to do in this country.

*Accordingly, breaking free means a total break with the comfort of pactism, softness, and gullibility, and a break from constant mournful retreat. We cannot remain silent any longer.*

So be it, let Hungarian society elect them in greater numbers, but people should know whom they elect when they elect them, and then it's all right: the MDF must leave the arena, and let the Hungarian electorate see the consequences of its choice.

But it is impossible for the MDF to assist in salvaging efforts, to support one or another kind of left-wing



persuasion, Lukacsism, bolshevism, and the continued life, the continued power of formations that appear in one or another guise, because doing so amounts to *treason!*

Accordingly, the MDF must cast out the spirit of the pact that rots it from within, the servile attitude that always proves the opponent's half truth to be correct, the debating society style and cowardice.

What are we afraid of? They will destroy us anyway, unless we break free. Where in the world would we find an authority which, after the Serbian death camps and the murder of children, could rightfully interfere with Hungarian domestic politics, disapproving the government's firm and autonomous steps?

We no longer need to wait for applause from abroad, because part of the outside world applauds helplessness and softness in response to suggestions made by the old banking connections, and calls democratic and market oriented that which amounts to robbery. We need control, laws and the observance of laws after the infinite corruption of gulyas-communism, in order to have a clear democracy and precise order. For everyone.

But this chapter is already part of

#### the new program.

The new program must be built on a few, firm pillars. The essence of these program pillars must be agreed upon by the leading bodies of the MDF prior to drafting the text of the final program, and all this must be reconciled with the government. Programs pertaining to governmental action and conduct must be publicized immediately to make clear that the government is working on the basis of the rulings and resolutions of the leading government party. Thereafter the government must begin to implement those resolutions that can be implemented by the cabinet as it is presently composed.

The public identifies the government almost completely with the MDF. Attacks on the government for doing this or that land on the MDF. Undoubtedly, the MDF lost some of its credibility as a result of its internal weakness, and on occasion also because of an incorrectly chosen local leader or because of positions taken by former communists or people declared to have been communists in the past. But the greatest loss of credibility suffered by the MDF resulted from the government's indecisiveness and from its mistakes, whether these were perceived or imputed, actually committed or forced upon it. And it clearly follows from the above, that there cannot be an authentic MDF program without the government manifesting a firm and renewed conduct. It further follows that no MDF election program can be successful without firm and renewed governmental conduct, because people are not going to have faith in an election program alone. To make this logic even more concise: In the remaining time even the most splendid

MDF program is going to become a matter of ridicule unless accompanied by unified, firm governmental actions.

For this reason, the only way to create a program is for the MDF to take the first step and to ask the government: can it, is it capable of making a firm change and streamlining its work at this time, at about midterm, and is it capable of taking steps which establish the moral foundation for the new MDF program. Unless this is possible, we are going to be faced with the same voter attitude that helped us become the governing party in 1990: elect anyone, except these people. This would occur even if we had the entire press in our hands, as the others had it in those days....

Quite naturally, the government could become more firm even without a party program, and it should, indeed, become more firm, because this is in the interest of the country.

And now about those pillars.

There is something without which there is no MDF:

#### our Hungarian character.

There may be differences in emphasis and in alternative internal tactical considerations regarding the way we profess our Hungarian character and mold this into policy, but there is no doubt that the MDF is distinguished from all other political forces by the fact that it places the vital issues of the Hungarian people above everything else. This is the alpha of the MDF's functioning, and the public has held the MDF accountable on this basis from the first minute it was established.

This criterion distinguished the MDF in its blossoming stage from other social and political groupings, and this is why it was able to attract most of the various groups that fought for the cause of Hungary. This was the essence and the distinguishing feature of every word we spoke and of all our messages: not only of those contained in the Lakitelek statement, but in subsequent communications, in all our utterances ranging from the testimonies of simple members to Jozsef Antall's "15 million Hungarians." This consideration guided us when we began our initial search for allies until we reached a coalition agreement.

Even in the days of the party state, when we sought a political sponsor and found one in the reform wing of the MSZMP, we found only one sponsor in the person of Imre Pozsgay and his associates, because in that place, at that time, only his tight group represented the Hungarian people. (Matyas Szuros' team appeared on the scene later.) They became reformers although they could have done otherwise, but in order to cooperate with the evolving MDF it was necessary to observe a certain minimum level of Hungarian character.

This basic position of ours is precisely why the party state recognized us as the main threat from the first moment on. No call to unite the nation that was as



effective as ours had been heard since the national statement of 1956—a call that was drowned in blood. In the eyes of a regime established to serve a foreign power and actually conducting anti-national politics, our call amounted to an indefensible challenge and made the total difference. Only this program had a chance to acquire full legitimacy. Only this program had—would have had, I will add sadly—the moral force capable of creating a new Hungary, and putting our nation back on its feet.

A nation that stands tall once again cannot be ruled. We were also regarded as dangerous because we did not want to rule, but wanted to help the nation get back on its feet.

We must regain this original power of ours to recruit people. Without that we may be confused with others.

But a number of obstacles rise on the path of regaining this power.

Having to regain something is the primary obstacle.

We have lost our talent.

Why have we lost our talent? Because we did not have enough courage, backbone, and strength to retain our talent. We were naive, gullible, and often acted as fall guys. We permitted a situation to evolve in which we were forced to continuously defend ourselves. We provided a lot of explanations. We lacked faith in ourselves. We lacked faith in each other. We adopted the enemy's parlance. We fell for the terms "populism," "Christian course," "gentlemen's Hungary," "Horthy-fascism," "anti-Semitism," etc. This list of terms is not complete. Equally, we failed to make clear that when we had worked together for a while with the national reform communists, we had been working with an almost similarly persecuted, excluded segment, the nationalistic part of the MSZMP, and that we had made this alliance against the above-mentioned bolshevik ruling network based on the

**"what is possible" principle.**

Today's national forces are scattered on all sides, both on the "Right" and on the "Left." Not only because they cleverly incited us to oppose each other, but also because we were not ready to cooperate. No one noticed the implicit, great danger in dispersion.

Above all, we must overcome our blindness. We must not allow ourselves to lose our greatest treasure and ornament. With strong will, unflinchingly, we must recapture the position we once occupied in the hearts of the Hungarian people.

Internal debate among the various trends we represent must not be suspended, but instead, we must have a situation in which each trend points out this common seed, this original capital, and in which everyone takes a united stand against attacks from the opposite side, which is trying to appropriate and to communize this asset. And no one should side with an outside group

against any one of the trends we represent. All this, however, represents the easier things that need to be resolved.

The greatest difficulty lies in the situation in which Hungarian society finds itself today. Financial problems, a lower standard of living, unfulfilled promises, the failure to do justice, the tremendous gains made by the former nomenklatura in the economy, the present enrichment of, and country-wide robbery by the beneficiaries of the previous system, and flagrant differences in financial situations—many of these are necessary and unavoidable, but are nevertheless offensive. All these things, jointly and individually, have made the masses, the majority indifferent, and coupled with the discrediting campaign waged by the press, the radio and the television, have even made people who voiced populist, Hungarian ideas seem offensive.

*A significant part of our electorate is scared.* People who would like to transcend the difficulties of their own lives and to join us in voicing populist Hungarian ideas are also scared. They prefer to remain silent because they fear being stigmatized, they are afraid of losing their jobs and are concerned about their children.

Whom were we able to defend against these kinds of attacks by the unified Left? Isn't this what people are saying when they throw in our faces that "nothing has changed"?

"One cannot sing hymns with an empty stomach," but what happens if even the one person

**who chants a prayer despite his empty stomach**

is cut down...?

Accordingly, the first thing to do is to defend all honorable people and everyone who needs to be defended against attacks or offenses suffered for belonging to us, and for being Hungarian.

We must use every opportunity to ease the burden on the people. We must change the system by which we share the public burden so that the system becomes fairer, because there are some incapable of going on any longer. Not all fortunes were derived from enterprise and talent, not all capital accumulation is "original." (At best it is based on only one "original" idea: abusing or exploiting the law.)

We must use every means to fully enforce our laws. Economic crimes must also be exposed retroactively, and must be punished severely. We must begin to break down the power of the nomenklatura, i.e., we must take away its authority over state property and we must examine how it became "capitalist." We must dispel the falsehood that this kind of stringency hinders privatization and the influx of foreign capital. (We are better off if capital hindered by the enforcement of legality does not even enter our country....)

We must clarify the kind of middle class we want.

We should strive for a national middle class rooted in the people.

We must establish financial foundations for this. The series of compensation laws greatly contributes to middle class development; we must accelerate the implementation of these laws, but must also invent additional benefits.

We need an economic policy based on Hungarian, populist-national foundations, not economic shots in the arm prepared at the planning office. Our survival depends on this. Nothing is sacred except the national interest. Accordingly, we must not surrender the right to define what constitutes the national interest, a right we once acquired and must reacquire again.

Accordingly, there is no basis for playing the crooked game of consensus.

Consensus is the most recent watchword used by the nomenklatura, designed to preserve its power. Even a reference to consensus presents mortal danger.

Therefore, any perception that advocates flirtation or seeking alliance with the nomenklatura, or with the already bourgeois-turned nomenklatura, is flawed from the outset. These perceptions amount to no more than vain hopes. This alliance was already established by someone else before we could have established it. This nomenklatura has been in power ever since 1945 in changing forms. The MDF was organized to counter this nomenklatura. It was organized not simply against the Kadar-Aczel system, and not even against "communism"; terminating continuous dominance that changes form and color, that transcends systems and eras, and that always takes advantage of the Hungarian people—the populist masses—has been the main goal, and continues to be the only possible main goal. Forming an alliance with this nomenklatura would mean a specific denial and abandonment of the system change. It would mean that we threw the lives of our children and grandchildren into the mouths of a hydra with a hundred heads.

We will not even have a chance to make another attempt to change the system if we establish this alliance and agree to this bargain. We will be liquidated and a new system called democracy will be proclaimed, but that system will *not mean democracy for us*.

It is possible that due to certain global political constraints we are not going to have an alternative to retaining governmental power except by striking this bargain. Even then, the MDF must not strike this bargain. If it does, every opportunity for making a new start is going to be lost. Although it is true that we find ourselves in a bad situation and that these two years were not to our advantage, it is equally true that we can claim some results. If we renew ourselves, we can start anew and realize our original goals. In that case, we will only have to make up for one delay.

### Knocking out the nomenklatura

is far from being as great a task as it is presented to be by the other side. It should suffice to hold to account only a few hundred people within strict limits of legality, and to punish them under the law, for us to see this looting bourgeoisie—left without Soviet support—falling to its knees before us, betraying one another. The government must urgently renew itself, if for nothing else than to enable the MDF to run in the elections at all. The government must shed the ballasts of halfheartedness and hesitation, it must rise above suspicion and sever all relations with the rear guards and the system of relationships of the old system, and must take radical steps to smoke out from every staff the people who do not fit there, and the forces that sabotage in the background; without hesitation, it must enforce laws approved by a majority of the National Assembly.

Order must be established without delay at Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television, and the illegally appointed intendants and their hangers-on must be removed, by the police, if needed. And if the President of the Republic continues to resist, if he walks the path of illegality, any administrative action, the use of any force should be permitted, *because the illegality of any such action would be dwarfed by the illegality of his repeated refusals to sign.*

*If the government is incapable of accomplishing this, the remainder of the MDF must not remain under the government, because*

**the whole thing is going to cave in**

*and crush the MDF to death.*

This must be understood literally.

If we were to lose the elections, genuine MDF people would have nothing else to do but to "search for places where they could serve as errand boys...."

True, the size of the MDF membership has also shrunk, true, the MDF does not have the entire Hungarian intelligentsia on its side, true, at present we would not be able to fill every post with a card-carrying member of our own, but we never even wanted to do that. On the other hand, we need not worry about people staying away once the government's work becomes firm. People rallying around us would not be those who make quick changes, the scarecrows with ball bearings on the "road to Damascus," but members of that young and middle-aged stratum that wants to, and is able to do something, the stratum that has thus far stayed away from us because it recognized that by working for us they would become defenseless.

*One cannot be engaged in politics without showing force.*

We must break with the way we were until now, we must abandon the character that radiated weakness and uncertainty. Things should happen in this country the way we want things to happen, and not the way former communists and people who became liberals permit things to

happen. To accomplish this, however, that small remnant must first be united in wanting something to happen, the small group of what is left of the MDF today.

Renewal is not at all a Sisyphean task. When the MDF announced its start in 1988 without funds, means, or support, and when it was the center target of the hostile power, it planned to hold a congress a year later, once its membership reached 10,000. The time for a National Rally came a few months thereafter because the note we struck was authentic. We can repeat this performance.

All we must be aware of is the kind of society in which we live and the people on whom we can count.

We must recognize that the moral decay inherited from the Kadar-Aczel system—that system's chief means of governance—has only deepened. We must accept grave responsibility before God and Country for having allowed this to happen during our term of governance. *We did not cause this to happen, but we permitted others to cause this to happen.*

No society, no nation, and not even a primitive tribe or animal species can exist without a sense of justice. Sense of justice and doing justice are functions of organisms that prevent individuals, groups and cells set against the community from working their way into the community, into the organization, to perform destructive work there. During the two years of our rule (?) the demanding nihilism of gastric juices and relativism that has risen in smoke on the bonfire of demagoguery took the place of a sense of justice in Hungarian consciousness. The already-mentioned sense to live for the moment, the demand for instant gratification, and pointing fingers at others abounds in the reality of Hungary.

We must be aware of how this society really is.

#### First of all: it is old.

Due to decades of attrition we have a disproportionately large older generation. Many of these elderly people have become bitter, their hearts have hardened due to loss of hope, and yet, these are our compatriots who have become hardened by much suffering, to whom it would suffice to hear a kind word, to learn about a small task they could perform; these are the ones on whom we can primarily count, and for whom we have done quite a lot.

It should be apparent that we must do even more for them, for those who are no longer able to engage in enterprise, who perform the greatest service to the homeland if—*after our renewal!*—they enable us to do everything possible for the young Hungarian generations, for their enterprises, for a *Hungarian Hungary*.

As it stands today, young people have been turned against us. We are to be blamed for that. *Young people hate nothing more than helplessness and the possibility of being caught by surprise.* One can attract them only with pragmatism and toughness.

If we are able to provide bread to these fresh forces, if we dare to put them in the places of party-outsider bolsheviks who have grown too old, if we dare to let them teach and preach from the pulpits, if we dare to trust even those who see many things differently, we will find these presently disgusted young people on our side.

At the same time we must also have the courage to tell young people about the things we consider unacceptable. These are: sickly attitudes, demands for sustenance, the inability to perform persistent work, and the adoration of alien idols.

Great goals must be established for young people.

*The Yalta Agreement is going to expire in 1995.* By then, every successor state around us that was established in Trianon will find itself in a different framework of existence.

Something that we always believed to be an injustice to us is being proven. The new century and the new situations present new opportunities and new threats to the Hungarian people. The basic question is, of course, whether there is going to be a new Hungarian generation capable of staving off these new threats, and whether it is going to be able to take advantage of these opportunities for creating Hungarian Lebensraum [eletteretteremto lehetosegekkell]. We, the older Hungarian democrats, have only one function: We must provide ways by which these new generations gain consciousness and position themselves. To accomplish this we must scuttle all defeatist attitudes.

Placing education and upbringing on Hungarian foundations must be a pivotal thesis in the new MDF program. The contaminated nihilists of the old system should have no say in creating the Hungarian future, in developing a new order for education. This is an issue on which we must not compromise.

It makes no sense having an MDF, if during its term in government and with a majority in the National Assembly an education law takes effect that provides room for stagnant Marxism and reform communism, and that does not fully serve the Hungarian future, *that fails to realize our original education program 100 percent.*

In order to discourage the inclination of a significant number of our youths to act in an infantile manner—an inclination that actually translates into the requirement that their needs be taken care of and permits youths to identify themselves with the prevailing order and the homeland only to the extent that this requirement is met—it is necessary to enforce a strict system of criteria in society, providing no exceptions. Quite naturally, this would not conflict at all with the concept of democracy.

We must put an end to the sickly practice according to which we blame the skinheads—part of our youth—for every evil, then have them raised by the police while we note with forgiveness other sickly phenomena, crimes and cultural criminal activities. One must not shrink from

recognizing that deterioration also has genetic reasons. We must recognize that for too long we have had living among us disadvantaged, moreover cumulatively disadvantaged strata and groups in which the rigor of natural selection does not function, because there is no sense in it. Society must support, and present as an emotionally appealing model those strong, viable families which organize themselves to work and to accomplish things today. We must be very careful that differences in financial situations and birth not inflict injuries upon children, injuries that are recognizable at an early age but create lifelong advantages and disadvantages. No talented child should start out as a second class citizen, with an attitude of surrender and having aged prematurely.

Socialism adopted a policy in this regard, but one that was never implemented, one that moreover, was turned around to create the reverse effect: The principle of *using people as a resource*. One cannot deny the validity of this principle. *Indeed, we must use the people as a resource, and we must do so by lifting up as many people as possible, and from as deep as possible.* Only this way can a strong, national middle class evolve, one that preserves the country, the homeland.

#### And then the PEOPLE....

As shameful as it is that we permitted a situation to evolve in which the idea that we serve the Hungarian people, the vital issues of the Hungarian people, was disputed and taken away, and that we surrendered our most important recruiting song in the course of defending ourselves against the sly charge of nationalism, we also inflicted even greater political damage on ourselves the same way, by allowing that the sacred concept of the people be taken from our lips. We were bombarded with the concept of populism.

Our enemies knew much better than we did that it would be life-threatening for any party and any government to de-throne the concept of the people after decades of socialism in Hungary, while the "people" were compensated by being bombastically raised to the level of God, along with simultaneous, terrible exploitation and neglect.

Any party that is unable to do justice, moreover, under whose rule the injustices experienced by the people and the poor reach high up to the stars, and which, at the same time, surrenders the idea of addressing, honoring and referring to the people, is sentenced to die.

The MDF walked into the trap. It did not dare to accept its own populist-national wing—indeed, the foundation of the MDF—which, in its own way, felt the offenses most, and amid belt-tightening economic and financial policies and policies that failed to do justice, it allowed itself to be declared the party of "gentlemen," the party that "wore elegant trousers" and "kid gloves."

Having an ethnic character and the need to integrate with Europe are not in conflict. We would have suffered no disadvantage but would have made a colossal gain,

had we been called "people from Mucsa" [from the sticks] and had the people identified themselves with us. But in order to do so, we should have accepted, and correspondingly voiced our own ethnicity, with a pride befitting a Hungarian democrat.

One must recognize that in Hungary, which was a 51-percent peasant country just a few decades ago, where the backbone of literature and culture consists of populist materials and those that were refined into populist materials, in the country of Bartok and Kodaly, one cannot pursue non-populist politics just because *the word Volk [original in German] has a suspicious ring in the ears of some*. We should orchestrate our politics only after our nation has a middle class cathedral raised from the populists.

Accordingly, the MDF must repent and *confess its trespasses against the people*, its ingratitude, and must return to the pure source. Otherwise the people—who do not even exist according to certain liberals—are going to respond with indifference and absenteeism. At best.

Indifference and absenteeism mean certain defeat. Those who turned away from us did not turn elsewhere. Where could they go? Ashamed, they went into hiding; as Hungarians, they were ashamed on our behalf for having to hide in their homeland.

#### Hungarian people—Righteousness—Populism:

one must align politics to this and for this. Things have been done in the reverse thus far. The bankruptcy and pile of ruins left to us by socialism produced a certain kind of economic and financial emergency policy, which we were unable to implement. We suffered defeats mainly in the field of privatization and issues pertaining to ownership, and outsiders, or our enemies, tried to explain to society an economic policy that had been forced upon us. We made excuses. We put out brush fires.

It appeared, but it was only an appearance, that we were starting out from a realistic situation and that economic necessities directed our steps.

No. The previous government did not leave behind an acceptable, itemized accounting and an assessment of the situation. It did not reveal these things, because the previous government itself could not tell why and how money, value, and the fruits of national labor flowed out, and continue to flow out from the country. The nomenclatura and the great interest groups of the previous era—which mutually overlap—were able to force upon us their economic interests to continue their privileges.

We proclaimed the primacy of, and support for small entrepreneurs, but we were unable to place this stratum into a proper situation. We were unable to act against corruption in government, against those who gambled with fortunes, against legally acceptable robbery, and against the transfer of national assets abroad.

*We need a new MDF* in order to be able to change all this. Thus far we have appreciated members who were the first to join us and who remain active members.

Quite naturally, these people must be appreciated also hereafter, but in order to renew ourselves we need new people to join our ranks.

We should initiate a new numbering system. From our standpoint, the most valuable people at this time are those who agree to cooperate with us now, and are willing to share the risks and the sacrifices. To accomplish this, however, we need not only a party and a movement that renews itself, but above all, a renewed and decisive government, which establishes the MDF's credibility.

*Our last chance to do so comes this fall.*

The National Congress scheduled for this fall to elect new officers must create a new program for the 1994 elections, *and under no circumstance can it avoid providing a candid accounting to the people.*

The National Congress will be able to show something, if in the meantime, the government appears able to renew itself and to take decisive action, and is capable of controlling primarily the economic processes, a control that is missing today.

Failing this, the MDF cannot agree to watch the nomenclatura and the Left topple the government and destroy all the chances of the government in 1994 with the help of the radio and the television, because the MDF represents a greater value even in its ruins than the coalition government. The MDF cannot permit the leadership of the country to slide back into the hands of the left-wing bloc that has reigned continuously ever since 1945 and has now been forced to pause. This would be the final hour of the Hungarian people.

This transaction is brutal and deadly dangerous.

Death is present in every element of these steps. Death—what a tragedy! It is the great shadow on the Hungarian system change.

The National Meeting must designate and must present a new leadership, a chairman, a presidium—the MDF's recommended leadership for 1994.

The change need not be made right away, but the new people must at least enter a state of preparedness at this point already. This renewed leadership must begin reorganizing the party and mobilizing the Hungarian people; it must reassure everyone that the pact mentality belongs to the past; it must *organize society* by observing the above-described three principles—the Hungarian people, righteousness, and populism—for a new, self-saving program of renewal *that brings about a full Hungarian system change.*

It should be apparent that this carries the risk of breaking up the MDF. It is entirely natural that the present membership and hierarchy of the MDF has segments that could not agree to assume this risk.

This is true, except for the fact that the present situation came about because *despite their convictions and fatal state of being under-informed, the basic masses of the MDF manifested some desperate faith and adherence, and accepted the helplessness of the leadership and their government's inability to act*, they tolerated things and made sacrifices, and wiped off the filth other people threw in their faces.

They waited and waited. They always persuaded themselves that their impatience was harmful and that there must be a reason for the government's continued silence and waiting for things to happen.

As we could see, there were, and still are such reasons. An unbelievably great pressure weighs down the government and its head.

But a schizophrenic state of mind like this can only destroy people.

Surely, the faithful MDF membership has suffered through these exclusionary years. But this must not go on any longer, *everything is going to be lost this way.*

**There is no alternative, we must break free.**

The MDF cannot hold another National Congress that covers up problems and evades issues. *It must hold the government accountable for fulfilling the MDF's resolutions.*

There undoubtedly exists much weakness, political naivete and gullibility in today's MDF. But there is no other membership, and at present there is no other party or movement in this country better prepared to serve and to make sacrifices, and one that is more faithful than the MDF. This is the party that must be replenished, this is where we must attract the hesitating middle-aged generation that presently tries to consume its surplus energy outside of our organization. We must act, because active people will join us only if they see all of us moving, moreover, moving ahead.

Accordingly, it is now the government's turn. *The MDF cannot agree to series of surrenders, retreats, media bargains and mistakes.*

(At one time I signed off agreeing to my own internment at the Central Prison. I do not want to sign that paper once again.)

All this unavoidably affects the person of Jozsef Antall.

Jozsef Antall is the great figure in Hungarian politics; among history's conciliatory, stabilizing and preserving politicians his place is somewhere between Deak and Istvan Bethlen. Without his wisdom, self-control, foresight and sobriety this country would have sunk into confusion a long time ago.

But fate—God—is not merciful enough toward him and the Hungarian people.

As we know, Jozsef Antall is not entirely healthy. His illness has once already been hideously taken advantage of. They scheduled the taxi blockade for the day when he was operated on. As much as he was a winning ticket in the 1990 elections, he can be embarrassed now due to his illness. Considering the kinds of depraved people we are faced with—communists!—it would be inconceivable for them not take advantage of his illness against him, and against us in the election struggle.

But let us face the facts: Can the people be expected to elect as their first man, their responsible leader, someone whose health is not in a satisfactory condition?

Antall is not only a great statesman, but also a tragic hero. Because all that we have enumerated above, all that the MDF must break free from, could also be listed as positive factors: *in exchange for these the country survived, we did not sink into chaos and insolvency, and no one had to go without or wander away.*

Global politics is cruel and evil and unsparing. Only history will tell the number of things the Hungarian people have been saved from as a result of Antall's wait-and-see policies.

*And we now ask him to turn the other way and to show his strength and the strength of his government. We ask him—a man who had been visited by God—to do this.*

We must ensure him a part in designating and training the successor. This action cannot be delayed. The renewed leadership of the National Congress must render decisions concerning these issues.

The [armed] men in quilted jackets who serve the former nomenklatura lurk around our backyards.

This government has performed the most difficult tasks, it has taken the most drastic actions in the process of transformation. It was spent in the process. It could not even have happened otherwise.

#### **But the MDF must not perish,**

*because the MDF is the most distinctive formation of this Hungarian century, it incorporates every value the Hungarian people acquired, suffered for and manifested in the revolution, together with all of our national shortcomings. The waves will clash over the heads of the Hungarian people if the MDF collapses.*

For this reason, however brutal these words may be, irrespective of the extent to which the one who says these words must struggle with the anxiety of an orphaned child, these words must be said.

There are moments when one has to rise not only above politics, but also his own heartbeat.

Life! this is the word that calls us today.

### **MDF, Government, Opposition Reactions to Csurka**

#### **Deputy Debreczeni's Response**

*AU0109113092 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG  
in Hungarian 27 Aug 92 p 7*

["Text" of open letter from Jozsef Debreczeni, parliamentary deputy of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, to Istvan Csurka, deputy chairman of the same party; place and date not given: "Open Letter to Istvan Csurka"]

[Text] Dear Pista, I do not think I have ever before felt such a strong urge to write as now, after your article that appeared in the MAGYAR FORUM. As I read it over and over again, my conviction grows stronger: When one cannot remain silent any more, one has to speak with the utmost sincerity and openness.

Ever since I got to know you, I have had ambivalent feelings, and a duality of attraction and repulsion toward you. I was impressed by your determination, intense emotions, truthful passion, and the sensitivity that helped you touch upon, tread on, and lean into the middle of the problems and the essence of the matters. At the same time, I was put off by the intolerance and aggression that accompanied this. You have always grasped the important and exciting burning issues but always with such a brutality that immediately discredited your passion of searching for the truth, turned it into a wild agitation, and made it impossible for others to join it.

The relentless expression of the whole truth is a virtue of writers. The morals of the politicians are different. They have to implement the "truth," realize it, and put it into practice. This always involves compromises. In politics, it is not only insufficient to tell the "truth" but mostly it is also harmful. It spoils the chances of implementation. You, Pista, remained a writer in politics, and a schematic one at that.

I have been watching your influence rise in the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] week by week and month by month. The person who, in 1988-89, could be dealt with and put in his place with a forgiving smile, a joke, a wave of the hand; the man who was our reckless and angry writer, our elephant in the china shop, this fierce green edge of the MDF rainbow turned into a thick mast, a beam, almost a keel but certainly a weight of the MDF's ship by 1991-92. He is an important factor, the membership's idol who cannot be ignored, without whom a decision could not be made ("has Pista said O.K. to this yet?"), deputy chairman, member of the faction's Presidium, chief ideologist, prophet, and a people's tribune.

The key to this was simple: At the very beginning you overtook, or let us be fair, you established (in your own image) the MAGYAR FORUM, our newspaper, the bible of all members. Through this, you slowly and systematically transformed the membership to your

liking. You recruited many and frightened away others, mainly the intelligentsia. You also became the preacher in the "Vasarnapi Ujsag" [Sunday morning radio program] and, as some kind of angry prophet of the Old Testament, you were really able to, or only able to, fanaticize the already agreeing group of followers or believers, and to frighten off the troop of outsiders even more. You always generated adoration and hatred. Which was greater, I wonder, the gain or the loss? What could be the more accurate measure of the general mood created by you, the boiling atmosphere of the gatherings or the icy ambivalence of the ones who stayed at home? What can the strong emotions of 200 people show from the views of people in a town of 100,000? I know that you do not believe the figures of public opinion polls, but I have a figure that is checked weekly and that I vouch for. I know one person out of a 60-member teaching staff who likes you. They are high school teachers, young and old, seven or eight party members, perhaps two of them communists (no Jews, as far as I know).

You know, many of us have thought for a long time that the trouble is not so great. Although you alienate very many valuable people, give us many hard and sometimes shameful moments, nevertheless, you bind an enthusiastic and fanatical group who are better off with a high profile where we can keep an eye on them. The MDF is a center party anyway, a gathering party of many views and styles, and it does no harm to have contact with as many areas of Hungarian society as possible. We will counterbalance this and show our better sides, the government policy is solid, and Prime Minister Antall's wisdom and unquestionable prestige is a guarantee for the ship not to capsize and for it to go in the right direction.

However, your latest writing created a new situation. The first astonishment came from its anti-Antall overtones, which were veiled by an exaggerated, and therefore obvious, effort. This has already been discussed by others. One thing is certain: A question asked by the deputy chairman of the MDF in public—"can a people be expected to elect someone as the first person and responsible leader whose state of health is not satisfactory?"—did more damage to our election prospects than the amount of damage that can be done by all our opponents in the remaining two years. Not to mention the fact that, by this, you are trying to remove the main cohesive force of a party that embraces many different views.

You are trying to homogenize this party even at the cost of, as you say, "a risk of breaking up the MDF." Even when considering the original trends of the MDF, you only know about "Christian," "popular," and "peasant party socialist" (?) trends, in contrast to the party program accepted at the national meeting that defines the political spectrum as follows: "It includes the democratic popular-national traditions, national liberal and Christian-Democratic ideas, environmentalists, and movements emphasizing the local autonomies."

Your past and future vision of the "MDF is differentiated from all other political forces by placing the vital issues of Hungarians above all things. ... this was the difference from other social and political groups already at the very beginning. ... Nothing but the national interest is sacred."

Dear Pista, this is not true! The official program of the party that I joined and of which I am a member says that "it equally accepts representation of national interests and values, and the democratization of society; it does not differentiate between their importance and finds them inseparable." This is the program that the majority of the Hungarian people voted for when, as a result, we came to power!

Naturally, you do not simply "forget" about democracy when talking about Hungarians. You have very obvious statements in the text. You call on the government "not to hide behind foggy slogans and paragraphs of democracy" and encourage by saying that, in comparison to the "Serbian death camps and child murders," its, as it were, "arbitrary and determined steps" cannot create an international uproar. In addition, when you mention your intention—that in itself threatens democracy with annihilation—according to which "order should immediately be established in the Hungarian Radio and Television ... if necessary by using police force," then you are again trying to give free rein to the unlawfulness saying that "any kind of administrative measure or the use of force is permissible because neither is as unlawful as the denial of approving the removal of the radio and television chairmen from their positions."

If our neighbor steals, can we also steal? How can this be, dear Pista?

Unfortunately, you do not only announce the disposal of democracy.

How should we view texts like "in this country, things must happen the way we want them. ... To achieve this, the small minority of the MDF has to have a common will first." For heaven's sake, a place where the will of the small minority prevails is called a dictatorship! The MDF stands for Hungarian "DEMOCRATIC" Forum! Is it possible that you left out the second word from the title of your newspaper on purpose as early as in 1989?

The exclusionary efforts also appear in other places. "We must again seize the right to formulate the national interest" which is the one and only sanctity. We must prevent any "individuals, groups, and cells from infiltrating the community and doing their destructive work," and "we must destroy all defeatism." The rule of a single party as the guarantee for the survival of the national community! This horror is already well known from this horrible century!

Naturally, an enemy image is also necessary for this "vocation." "The paratroopers who are either the Galilei Circle, or the newspaper of the bourgeois liberal thinkers, or the murdering terrorists of Bela Kun and



Tibor Szamuely, are moving about in the body of Hungarian society.... This troop, in ever-changing form, is always present in every big social change." Naturally, they are the ones who, "in the interest of maintaining the continuous power structure since 1945" are now embodied in the Alliance of Free Democrats and the communists, and they are acting because "the mediators in Paris, New York, and Tel Aviv command them to do so."

Dear Pista! For me, a professional historian, this modern age transmigration of souls is very amusing, and I am also very familiar with the concept of Jewish-communist world conspiracy, however, this matter cannot be dealt with as simply as this. I also do know some things about the culture and history of the Jews in the ancient times, middle ages, and modern age. I know about the strong cohesion of this people, their special ability to exert their interests, which is partly the result of their higher bourgeois development level, and I have heard about some international links. I know and I can see that, since the holocaust, suspicion and the feeling of threat have organized the above qualities into a preventative strategy: Everything must be done to prevent the recurrence of the horror or even the emergence of a situation where its germ or slightest remains or possibility can take root. Since my heart sank at the sight of the mountain of children's toys abandoned at Auschwitz, I understand these intentions. I also understand that, for the outsiders, the grasping and holding onto positions that appear a mere power struggle and the wild fears behind them only grow stronger in reaction to steps taken against them. I understand that your conspiracy theory expounded in your article with great vehemence is seen by them as a brutal manifestation of anti-Semitism. Placing it in the context of the whole pamphlet, I must say that they are right.

The particular exclusive and exclusionary national collectivist view that shines through your writing has certain ethnic-biological overtones. "The national middle class originating from below (change of guard?) has to be established" with the help of material goods taken away from the Jewish-communist nomenclature, and "we have to draw from below, as deeply and as many times as possible" because "this deterioration also has genetic causes ... and society should be supporting the strong families that are capable of surviving...."

After the program of establishing the internal Hungarian living space, the "external possibilities of establishing a living space" also emerges. These will be given after 1995 when the Yalta agreements expire, on the territory of the successor states of Trianon, and the new Hungarian generation will have to make use of this.

Pista, I know that this is already a lot, and I am not balancing the factors of pragmatic interest and power structures and political expediency. There are situations when one is incapable of this and when this would be a crime. Your pamphlet created just such a situation for me and for us. I must therefore end my letter and say that

the aggregate of all the elements I have shown from your text so far (and that cried out from it!): The national collectivism that excludes, originates in racism, and is shown as the only value, coupled with the anti-democratic, anticommunist, and anti-Semitic elements, faultlessly correspond to the standard principles of a complete Nazi ideology. I, we, and the MDF have nothing to do with this and will not have anything to do with it in the future, either.

### MDF National Board Statement

*Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian  
31 Aug 92 p 5*

[Statement issued by the Hungarian Democratic Forum's National Board on 30 August 1992]

[Text] The National Board of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] has discussed Istvan Csurka's writing entitled "A Few Thoughts...."

It has high regard for the fact that a majority of the ideals and arguments raised essential issues of concern to the MDF, which was formed five years ago, and in general, to advocates of national and Christian values in Hungary and abroad. The intention was to deepen their self-identity and to emotionally and morally reinforce their will to act.

Most of the findings contained in the writing can be used well in the development of the MDF's new program.

To dispel the confusion caused by arbitrary interpretations relative to the writing, the Board recommends that all interested persons familiarize themselves with the original text.

At the same time, based on certain statements contained in writing, which are indeed debatable, the National Board finds it necessary to once again declare its commitment to modern populist-national, Christian democratic, and national liberal endeavors, to parliamentary democracy, to constitutional statehood that must not be impaired, to the tolerance of being different, to a social market economy, and to being a center party.

The Board further declares its conviction that intellectual trends and trends based on one's outlook on the world continue to productively function in the framework of the MDF for the benefit of the continuous renewal of the party's and the movement's practical political unity, and of raising its professional standards.

Finally, in joining the 27 August statement of the National Presidium, the National Board declares that it supports with unbroken confidence Jozsef Antall as the chairman of the MDF, and as the prime minister of the Hungarian Republic.

Cegled, 30 August 1992

The National Board of the Hungarian Democratic Forum



### MDF Vice Presidents' Comments

LD2708200392 Budapest MTI in English 1448 GMT  
27 Aug 92

[Text] Budapest, August 27 (MTI)—The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) board said Thursday that it would be unjustified to deal with the succession of the prime minister now.

In a statement issued today, following the board's session on Wednesday, the board says it considers a study published by MDF Codeputy President Istvan Csurka in the August 20 issue of MAGYAR FORUM to be a political pamphlet.

In the document, compiled for the party's November congress that will reelect officials, Csurka accuses the government of powerlessness.

Referring to the illness of Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, who is also MDF president, Csurka proposes appointing a successor. However, the board's statement, issued at a press conference today, says this is unjustified.

Meanwhile, in reply to questions, Csurka said, if required, he could produce evidence that the Hungarian head of state was being directed from Paris, New York, and Tel Aviv, as he had written in the pamphlet.

MDF Codeputy President Gabriella Farkas said she was not afraid of a party split but said it was possible for Csurka to quit his post.

Addressing foreign policy issues, Csurka told MTI that "the Yalta Treaty ceased to be a political reality in 1992. States are being disintegrated or split into two and devastating ethnic wars are raging in Eastern Europe.

"In this situation, the Hungarian Government is bound to support all demands and actions of ethnic Hungarians beyond the border, including their claims for political autonomy," he said.

MDF spokesman Laszlo Medgyasszay, however, added that Hungarian foreign policy, which is backed by the MDF, stood on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter so it renounced the forceful modification of borders while it undertook to represent the Hungarians beyond the border.

### Antall's Speech

AU0209100192 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG  
in Hungarian 1 Sep 92 p 5

["Text" of Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's National Assembly speech on 31 August 1992: "No One Can Assume the Government's Responsibility"]

[Text] Mr. Chairman, Esteemed House!

I ask for your patience, I will not be long. This may be an extraordinary request, but I ask you—this includes my own government coalition as well as the opposition and the independents—to listen to my speech, my address,

without any expression of approval or disapproval until I finish. It is only in this event that I can tell you everything I would like.

For days, the press and the public have been showing concern about Istvan Csurka's study and thoughts. They have questioned a number of times why we do not speak about this issue. Well, we have spoken about it and, on the other hand, we must say that the deputy chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), our fellow deputy, indeed expressed this as his private view because he had not coordinated it with any organizations of the MDF and, according to his announcement and that of the leading members of our party, he had not discussed it with anyone. This has been confirmed. The Presidium and the National Board of the MDF have dealt with the study and a number of press reports have been published on this. We had an internal debate, which I believe was no more or less than in other parties. This is a coalition government. For this very reason, the coalition parties, including my own party, have to be able to work together with Deputy Istvan Csurka just like the different political bodies of the mainstream parties.

The government is not subjugated to a system of orders as in the central committee of a one-party system, it is not subjected to the decisions of a political committee. We have directions and programs, and the government makes independent and responsible decisions within these. No one can take over this responsibility from us and no one can prescribe to us to act differently. I believe that we have reached an agreement on this by now. The government receives plenty of criticisms from inside and outside, which is no surprise in the currently hard economic, political, and social situation, but I would like to stress that the Hungarian Government is most resolutely attached to the Hungarian national commitments, to democracy, the constitutional state, social market economy, and the values expressed in all other programs.

I will remain the leader of the MDF—as a result of the mandate of the voters and my own decision—and the head of the government—being mandated by parliament—as long as I can fulfill a solid commitment to the Hungarian nation, and the basic principles of parliamentary democracy and the constitutional state. However, my duty toward myself is not only to stand down when I can no longer fulfill the requirements, but it is also a duty not to give in, as a result of fear or misjudgment, to the calls and pointed references which, in the course of history, meant handing over power to Bela Kun, Hitler, and others. I hope that force will never again create such a situation in Hungary, and we must not give way to this in a parliamentary system.

In his political pamphlet—I am not using this term with the intention to offend—Istvan Csurka makes statements in which he gives voice to the strong emotions of some groups of our public, sometimes of considerable masses, raises questions, and then he shows the constraints and, in my view, he replies using a faulty interpretation, causing political damage and making

mistakes. Neither I nor the government can identify with this, just as the MDF Presidium and National Board could not identify with it.

I do not want to speak in detail about stories, the pact, and pacts in preparation. It is obvious that these are not true. I am not speaking of Yalta and the reasons behind it, regardless of the fact that everyone knows precisely what we understand by the Yalta-Potsdam system as a political system.

I cannot accept such statements, for example, that the IMF or the World Bank—not that they are that close to my heart—could be compared to the situation after World War II, or to issues relating to the Soviet occupation and so on, as a new financial or monetary world repression by the finance ministry. Nor do I agree with the practice whereby the parties do not first settle an argument internally, or when our party members publish their views in newspapers that are sharply opposed to the coalition, especially when they use statements that go beyond the bounds of reality. National liberalism, the tradition of the Hungarian popular and national idea, and European Christian Democratic thoughts have equal space in our party.

People who are equally committed to patriotism, constitutional statehood, and parliamentary democracy can and should be members of the MDF. I believe that this statement does not have the intention to exclude, and others can and obviously will accept this as a minimum. However, all this could not have happened if, in the previous period, just in the past three years, the political poisoning of wells had not taken place to the extent that it did. Comparing Hungary to other countries and the region, we can consider ourselves fortunate, but we must be aware that passions induce further passions. I do not wish to deal with the chicken-and-egg problem of who started it and what countereffect the allegation of anti-Semitism and collaboration with the communists has had in the past three years, which political parties abused the wind of anti-bolshevism to fill other sails and when, but the parties of the coalition and the government have had to conduct their activity in such a hostile atmosphere, which was far from the optimal circumstances of transition.

I repeat and declare that I am not against the press; I have repeatedly declared this, and I stick to it. I do not generalize, because I regard simplification and generalization on national minorities or on any related issues as extremely incorrect. Yet, one cannot disregard the behavior of some articles and journalists, although I do not wish to quote a series of deceptive and misleading articles about various issues, nor do I wish to quote even the various declarations. However, as an example connected with this case, allow me to mention a few things. For example: In the "Osztuz" program aired on 27 August, in his answer to a reporter, Istvan Csurka said the following: "I said something during the Presidium meeting held yesterday. I apologize. This was a mistake." This referred to me, to my illness.

Immediately after the program, the following was said during the "Esti Egyenleg" program: "In the 'Osztuz' program that preceded our program, Istvan Csurka defended every element of his essay, except the fact that bringing up the subject of Jozsef Antall's successor was a rash statement." There is a big difference between "I apologize" and "it was a rash statement."

Excuse me for bringing up such a personal question, because this is only a human instance, and there is nothing to say about this, and we clarified this among ourselves.

With the exception of UJ MAGYARORSZAG, which quoted it, and MAGYAR NEMZET, which reported its content, an extremely important part of the declaration made by the Presidium of the MDF in its meeting yesterday was ignored by the other dailies, or they only excerpted it. The passage in question is as follows: "On the basis of the really questionable elements of the document, (this was left out) the National Presidium regards it as necessary to repeatedly declare its commitment to modern, national, Christian-Democratic and national liberal efforts, parliamentary democracy, immaculate constitutionalism, tolerance of dissimilarity, without accepting a social market economy and a center party" [as published].

Why should such a passage be left out, a passage that makes it clear that the Presidium did not identify with the document fully, and that obviously debate preceded it? These are the futile things that lead to a bad atmosphere and which can give rise to an atmosphere of suspicion on every side, such as has afflicted us since the elections.

Then, the following was said in the NAP TV broadcast this morning: "The National Presidium of the MDF received Istvan Csurka's essay with understanding, an essay that has stirred a great nationwide storm, and the Presidium regarded the criticism connected with this essay as hasty." That is all.

Is that correct? I do not think this is in harmony with the obligation of the press to inform the public, and I can also say that there is also an ethical issue here.

These examples, just a few among the numerous such examples, have stirred emotions and indignation among some strata of the public, and I also have to say that certain declarations and a certain style on the part of those who have little right or little moral basis to bring up certain issues have a provocative effect. All this contributes to the emergence of tensions. Without getting into personal matters, and I know the biographies, I will nevertheless ask you: Is it in good taste when the prime minister who signed the Warsaw Pact, one who enjoyed a preferential prime ministerial pension to the last minute and one who was the prime minister of the government toppled by the revolution of 23 October 1956 criticizes the government that signed the agreement on dismantling the Warsaw Pact? I do not think that it will contribute to rapprochement and a good atmosphere

if someone confuses things, and if we do not advance on issues like real crimes, naming those who committed them, and seeking solutions on how to punish them; these things exacerbate Hungary's situation and stability, and facilitate emotions that probably few would like to see in this House.

Finally, in the interest of successfully completing and adopting the media law and in the interest of shaping a normal atmosphere, I cannot avoid saying how harmful it is to the Hungarian Constitution if the president of the republic gets into a situation in which he fails to sign a dismissal request made on the basis of the prime minister's proposal, in accordance with the valid law and despite the position of the relevant parliamentary committee. He regards as unambiguous the Constitutional Court's own decision on this same issue while, according to the president of the Constitutional Court, a conscientious follower of the law cannot have any doubts in connection with the decision; it can only be misinterpreted deliberately; consequently, one of the two interpretations is anticonstitutional. In my opinion, this unequivocal ruling made by the Constitutional Court means that the proposal submitted by the prime minister is constitutional, and the president of the republic should have signed the dismissals.

Everything that aims at extending the constitutional spheres of competence breaks up the unity of our Constitution. I declare all this on the moral and political basis that I had the opportunity to take an active part in formulating our Constitutions and I defended the position and dignity of the president of the republic and the creation of the institution of president in the current form—taking into consideration Law No. 1 of 1946, connected to Article No. 3 of the Law of 1848—at a time when others did not yet wish the creation of the position of the president of the republic. They would have been satisfied with reviving the Presidential Council; others wanted a cheerful, humorous, or at best a protocol president, or they were thinking in terms of presidential or semipresidential positions.

I think that cooperation between the president of the republic and the government should be based on the Constitution, and both international and domestic reactions to this would be favorable.

I consider all this to be important also because all those phenomena, including the demonstrations, the harsh tones mainly against the government—which is naturally duty-bound to tolerate more—have contributed to the things that have occurred recently, both in word and deed. This attitude contributes to the erosion of the centre forces and to the so-called Weimarization process, and this not only refers to one party but—I hope—to an increasingly broad circle of the parliament, and I would say that I would like it to refer to the entire parliament.

In our country's present international situation and its situation in Europe, amid the security situation that has evolved around us and the internal situation, our nation

cannot afford inner erosion and instability. (Let us not predict instability in advance.) This obliges us to declare that, apart from observing the natural customs and rules of a parliamentary multiparty system, we should pursue a cease-fire and a policy of sober reason, rather than senseless battles.

One would be wrong to think that Hungarian public opinion as a whole does not—in the last resort—make an overall judgment of our parliament, our government, and the cause of democracy. There are basic issues that we must make the whole public understand, and there are issues that cannot be used against each other, because everyone who sits here and who knows the issues from the inside and knows them more profoundly, is quite aware of what things could be done differently, what could be done better, or what could definitely not be done differently or better. And we have to tread the bitter and hard path together, because it is forced upon us by the political situation and the economic situation that have emerged. As the experts of the much-criticized IMF have also noted, Hungary's losses are equal to the total amount of losses caused by outside influence.

This does not excuse us from doing everything possible. I think one does not have to separately justify what this means. What I ask is that, on the basis of constitutional statehood and the nation's interest, the change in the regime and the legal and economic restructuring that has just been started should be carried out continuously, decisively, and purposefully. We should do this ever better and more successfully, and the National Assembly should try to work together by concentrating on the hard tasks ahead of us and that affect the whole country and the whole nation, and by concentrating on all the outside circumstances and inside problems. In connection with Csurka's article, I declare that I do not identify with it; there are parts in it that really give cause for concern and awaken our common responsibility. I have spoken in this form today as chairman of the MDF and as prime minister because I have previously outlined my opinion before the Presidium, the board, and our parliamentary faction, and the parliament session only opened today.

Thank you for listening to me and thank you in particular for fulfilling my request.

### Parliamentary Debate

AUO209100192 Budapest MTI in English 1942 GMT  
31 Aug 92

[Text] Budapest, 31 Aug (MTI)—The debate that followed the prime minister's address on Monday evening also focussed on the political pamphlet published by MDF's deputy president in the August 20 issue of the weekly 'MAGYAR FORUM.'

Contributors from the opposition parties called attention to the dangers entailed by Csurka's theses.

Marton Tardos, head of the parliamentary group of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], the biggest opposition party, welcomed Antall's conclusions and his dissociation from the pamphlet.

In concert with the prime minister, Tardos emphasised the importance of cooperation. He added, however, that it disturbs the stability of society if in a parliamentary democracy the opposition and the president of the republic are viewed as evil forces. It would be harshly unconstitutional, he said, that the rights of some minorities could be curtailed, as suggested by the pamphlet. What Csurka terms as a Hungarian lebensraum may be another source of danger, Tardos said, asking the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and the prime minister to dissociate themselves from these ideas.

Taking the floor because of being attacked personally, Csurka denied that the pamphlet suggested curtailing the rights of Gypsies and Jews.

Laszlo Kover (Federation of Young Democrats) said that the forces which could drive Hungary, this island of stability, into Balkan-type chaos have begun to dictate even within the governing party of this country.

Kover urged the MDF to adopt a clear position. He emphasised that, by issuing statements 'glossing over the essence,' the MDF organs 'made some Nazi ideas acceptable.' The fact that the MDF has been captured by Csurka may bring about the fall of the government, Kover said.

Imre Konya, head of the MDF parliamentary group, rejected Kover's 'generalising judgments.'

Zoltan Gal, head of the parliamentary group of the Hungarian Socialist Party, said, 'the socialists condemn those who give priority to supposed party interests over national interests and are not afraid of making unconstitutional and anti-democratic statements. This may bring about anarchy in political life and drive the country into a civil war... For this reason, the HSP takes a stand against the views expounded in Csurka's pamphlet.'

Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, the last contributor to the debate, said, 'we are standing on the foundation of the rule of law. The events some MPs spoke of will not take place. Some of their statements do harm to Hungary and endanger the country's stability.'

In the evening, MPs started the first reading of a bill on agricultural market rules.

Minister of the Interior Peter Boross announced that the government would ask back for revision the bill on data concerning officers and agents of the former internal secret service.

Monday was the last day of the summer session of parliament. The regular autumn session will begin on Tuesday.

### Government Criticism

*LD0309184192 Budapest MTI in English 1753 GMT  
3 Sep 92*

[Text] Budapest, 3 Sep (MTI)—During its Thursday session, the Hungarian Government unanimously adopted the following statement.

The government is convinced that a decisive majority of the Hungarian public sees with indignation and aversion the increasingly harsh rhetoric and actions in domestic public life, and political hysteria.

The government regards as irresponsibility and adventurism the arbitrary interpretation of the Constitution serving political ends, the false and deliberately deceptive information of public opinion, the mutual efforts by certain actors on the political stage to discredit and destroy each other, as well as the ensuing extremist and rejective political views burdened by prejudices.

The government firmly rejects endeavours of any orientation characteristic of totalitarian states, intentions running counter to general moral values, human and minority rights, the UN spirit and Charter and our international obligations, and will do all it can to safeguard the constitutional order whenever necessary.

Everyone should be aware that the phenomena disrupting the harmony of Hungarian public life and poisoning the political atmosphere stir up emotions, jeopardize calm and peace in the country, endanger democracy and the law-governed state, put at risk our international prestige and damage our national interests.

The government is aware that the occurrences hurting society's sense of justice add more fuel to existing passions, which are aggravated further by heavy burdens inherited from the former system. At the same time, the satisfaction of just demands in society is also being threatened by extremist actions.

It is the governments conviction that all political forces should make efforts towards easing confrontation and mitigating the storms of public life. Today the country's resources have to be concentrated on meeting the historic challenges lying ahead of us—this is also dictated by the interests of the country's citizens and Hungarians throughout the world.

### Csurka's Commentary

*AU0809115392 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG  
in Hungarian 3 Sep 92 p 5*

[Interview with Istvan Csurka, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by reporter identified as Mocsonoky; place and date not given: "I Indeed Applauded the Prime Minister—Istvan Csurka on the Decision of the MDF Faction"]

[Text] The following statement was published after the meeting of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] faction: "The parliamentary group of the MDF deputies

discussed issues arising in connection with Istvan Csurka's study 'A Few Thoughts.' The group of deputies decided that it agreed with every aspect of the views expounded by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall at the 31 August session of parliament."

In this speech, Antall said among other things:

"Istvan Csurka replies to many questions using a false interpretation, causing political damage and making mistakes; neither I nor the government can identify with this, just as the Presidium and the National Board of the MDF could not identify with it."

[Mocsonoky] Are we to understand this in such a way that the faction has now also distanced itself from your study?

[Csurka] The faction accepted the whole Antall speech. The above statement was certainly in the speech. However, the prime minister also made other statements that were very important for me. I quote: "In my view, this unequivocal decision of the Constitutional Court means that the prime minister's proposition was in accordance with the Constitution and the president of the republic should have signed it. Everything that intends to extend constitutional rights upsets the unity of the Constitution." Or in another place: "I believe that cooperation between the president of the republic and the government has to be based on the Constitution and this would be received favorably both in Hungary and abroad." What does this mean? It means that the prime minister said certain things in front of the parliament that he had not said before. I am fully satisfied with this, and [chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats] Peter Tolgyessy saw correctly that I applauded the prime minister, although at the end of his speech he again said that he did not identify himself with my study. A writer, even one turned politician, has to accept this. At the publication of my works I never thought that they would meet with a uniform approval. However, I am happy that I have given the prime minister an opportunity to say these words.

[Mocsonoky] However, after the stormy reception of your study, do you feel that you have not achieved your real goal?

[Csurka] I believe and I think it is true that I achieved the desired affect, in fact, even more than I had expected. People have started to think about the problems I raised and this goes through all organizations of the MDF and through other groups of society. must call attention to the fact that, in many cases, people are discussing their interpretations of my study rather than what is written in it. They do not deal very much with its essence, though, that I want changes in many areas. Instead of presenting arguments, they give me labels and call me names. I could mention Imre Kerenyi, according to whom I should be made to have a nervous breakdown. I congratulate this deeply humane and democratic way of thinking. I do not know how such a person can lead a theater....

[Mocsonoky] Nevertheless, the faction's decision raises the question of how big are the forces that support your ideas calling for changes?

[Csurka] I do not want to put together statistics on either the supporting or the contradicting views. I am not boasting and I do not want to analyze why this behavior is needed because politics is very refined teamwork. Now, I believe, everyone has to calm down. In this terrible drum-fire, it is not the time to give immediate answers to the questions that were raised. The hullabaloo surrounding the study has to stop first and then, when there is peace and quiet, I can further develop my thoughts. views like you and Jozsef Debreczeni stay in the same faction?

[Csurka] As you know, I will soon leave the Cultural Committee, but I will not leave the MDF and I do not expect this from Debreczeni, either. Nevertheless, he has to see the consequences of his views, but I do not wish to say any more about it.

#### SZDSZ Leader's View

AU0309120592 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG  
in Hungarian 29 Aug 92 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Ivan Peto, parliamentary deputy and member of the National Council of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Lajos Pogonyi; place and date not given: "We Need Cooperation Among the Opposition"]

[Excerpt] All the participants in our political life are dealing with Istvan Csurka's article in MAGYAR FORUM. We interviewed Ivan Peto about this article and about some topical issues of the activity of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ].

[Pogonyi] According to Csurka, fooling around with the consensus began with the pact between the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the SZDSZ. Along with the then party chairman Janos Kis, and Peter Tolgyessy, you were also one of the "young scoundrels" who signed that pact.

[Peto] Among other things, it transpires from the Csurka essay that he does not like if an agreement limits the rights of the parliamentary majority as he envisaged them. Csurka does not want to accept the fact that the pact in question was signed at a time when there was a need for compromise between the two parties that received most votes in the elections, in order to be able to govern Hungary. It is a stupidity to say that the pact began to damage everything good. Besides, Csurka hated the agreement from the very beginning because, at least at that time, it reduced his political influence.

[Pogonyi] The "lesson is now given" to the opposition: Whom should it trust more, the conservative Jozsef Antall, or Tamas Katona, the political state secretary who keeps declaring reformist concepts, or the extremist Istvan Csurka?

[Peto] The SZDSZ believes in everyone; this is not the issue; the question is whose will will assert itself in the future. So far, it seemed that Istvan Csurka's will has been asserting itself most dominantly.

[Pogonyi] In your opinion, who is now "on his way up"?

[Peto] So far, only MDF parliamentary deputy Bela Horvath has taken a clear position of supporting Csurka, but his intellectual and political weight is insignificant. The people who criticized Csurka within the MDF are all important people from every viewpoint. However, the position of the party Presidium and Jozsef Antall's recent declaration in the television program "A Het" show that Csurka's role within the MDF will probably increase.

[Pogonyi] However, you are obviously aware of the fact that there is a radical basis behind Csurka....

[Peto] There are considerable forces within the MDF who do not dare confront Csurka and the demands connected with his name. The events so far show that the aggressive MDF members who used a tougher tone achieved greater results than the more moderate deputies.

[Pogonyi] Csurka has now done something to the prime minister, something that Jozsef Antall failed to do to Csurka, namely he distanced himself from the prime minister.

[Peto] In my opinion, Csurka's political "philosophy" has no place in a Christian center-right party, like the MDF claims to be. Csurka's views did not become so extremist only after the elections, because a previous article called "Fathers and Sons" slandered the SZDSZ leaders, and this article was also published in the MAGYAR FORUM. Jozsef Antall deliberately wanted to integrate Csurka, so there is no sense in talking about the fact that the prime minister has not yet distanced himself from Csurka's views. All this is a policy that leads to unfortunate consequences, because it seems that it is not Antall who integrates the Csurka views, but the other way round. The leaders of the coalition parties must also be aware that the foreign embassies in Budapest will send such a brutal document like the one published by Csurka to their governments for studying. For this, there is no need for the opposition's "machinations" or its Western propaganda activity. One can fear that, in the current situation in Central Europe, when the deputy chairman of the largest party of the Hungarian Government explains the failures of his own government through some kind of Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy, this will throw Hungary into the general image that has emerged about this region. So far, we have succeeded in avoiding this. I fully agree with Jozsef Debrecezen when he says that the tone of the Csurka document as a whole has a "Nazi trend." It is fortunate that this did not have to be uttered by an SZDSZ politician.

[Pogonyi] According to Csurka's theses, the government is in a hurry and is improvising. Although in a different

context and with a different tone, the SZDSZ has also blamed the government of such things....

[Peto] Csurka blames the government for other things. Besides, the document does not give a clear picture of Csurka's claim that the government is improvising. There is nothing identical between Csurka's criticism and the criticism carried out by the opposition. [passage omitted]

### 1956 Federation's Statement

AU1009072992 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG  
in Hungarian 8 Sep 92 p 4

[National Press Agency report: "The 1956 Federation Supports Csurka"]

[Text] "We welcome Istvan Csurka's valuable article, fraught with much bitterness, but extremely useful to enlighten disturbed minds. The 1956 Federation welcomes Istvan Csurka's courageous and committed stand in favor of the Hungarian cause in his essay published on 20 August and entitled 'A Few Thoughts...'—begins the position published by the 1956 Federation on 7 September.

"As is well known, the document—that was published precisely on the occasion of our national day—has stirred a considerable storm. Quite a few members of his own party have distanced themselves from the writer.

"The 1956 Federation has been standing on almost similar ideas since the beginning of the change in the regime, but we have never felt that we are anti-democratic or 'fascists.'

"In any case, we, and we think that the broad strata of the Hungarian society as well, have learned a lot from Csurka's document that has stirred up deep thoughts. We now really see the extent to which the hands of the prime minister and of the entire government were tied after the change in the regime, so they could not act the way they wanted to and the way the Hungarian public expected them to.

"It is also unfortunate that, in connection with the pact, the coalition government carelessly released the press and the media from its grip and let them incite hatred against the government, the coalition, and the Hungarian people to this very day!

"Although we condemn any kind of racial, religious, and other discrimination among the citizens, we—the 1956 Federation—will always be among those who want Hungarian cooperation and a better future for Hungarians as long as we live."

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